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Why Groups Go to Extremes
Cass R. Sunstein'
The differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties in [the
legislative] department of the government ... often promote
deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the
majority.
-Alexander Hamilton1
In everyday life the exchange of opinion with others checks our
partiality and widens our perspective; we are made to see things
from their standpoint and the limits of our vision are brought home
to us.... The benefits from discussion lie in the fact that even
representative legislators are limited in knowledge and the ability to
reason. No one of them knows everything the others know, or can
make all tie same inferences that they can draw in concert.
Discussion is a way of combining information and enlarging the
range of arguments.
-John Rawls2
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Kahneman and David Schkade for many helpful discussions. Thanks too to C. Edwin Baker,
Robert Ellickson, Edward Glaeser, Robert Goodin, Christine Jolls, Dan Kahan, Timur Kuran,
Lawrence Lessig, John Manning, Andrei Marmor, Wiktor Osiatynski, Eric Posner, Richard
Posner, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and David Strauss for valuable comments. Participants in workshops
at Cornell and the University of Chicago provided a great deal of help. I am also grateful to
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particular to my commentators Norman Bradburn and Robert Luskin. Brian Lehman and Brooke
May provided excellent research assistance.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 426-27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 358-59 (1971).
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Each person can share what he or she knows with the others,
making the whole at least equal to the sum of the parts.
Unfortunately, this is often not what happens ....
... As polarization gets underway, the group members become
more reluctant to bring up items of information they have about the
subject that might contradict the emerging group consensus. The
result is a biased discussion in which the group has no opportunity
to consider all the facts, because the members are not bringing them
up.
•.. Each item they contributed would thus reinforce the march




Consider the following events:
" Affirmative action is under attack in the state of Texas. A
number of professors at a particular branch of the University of
Texas are inclined to be supportive of affirmative action; they
meet to exchange views and, if necessary, to plan further
action. What are these professors likely to think, and to do,
after they talk?
" After a nationally publicized shooting at a high school, a group
of people in the community, most of them tentatively in favor
of greater gun control, come together to discuss the possibility
of imposing new gun control measures. What, if anything, will
happen to individual views as a result of this discussion?
" A jury is deciding on an appropriate punitive damage award in
a case of recklessly negligent behavior by a large company; the
behavior resulted in a serious injury to a small child. Before
deliberating as a group, individual jurors have chosen
appropriate awards, leading to an average of $1.5 million and a
median of $1 million. As a statistical generalization, how will
the jury's ultimate award tend to compare to these figures?
3. PATRICIA WALLACE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 81-82 (1999).
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* A group of women is concerned about what they consider to be
a mounting "tyranny of feminism." They believe that women
should be able to make their own choices, but they also think
that men and women are fundamentally different, and that their
differences legitimately lead to different social roles. The group
decides to meet every two weeks to focus on common
concerns. Is it possible to say what its members are likely to
think after a year?
Every society contains innumerable deliberating groups. Church
groups, political parties, women's organizations, juries, legislative bodies,
regulatory commissions, multimember courts, faculties, student
organizations, those participating in talk radio programs, Internet discussion
groups, and others engage in deliberation. It is a simple social fact that
sometimes people enter discussions with one view and leave with another,
even on moral and political questions.4 Emphasizing this fact, many recent
observers have embraced the traditional American aspiration to
"deliberative democracy," an ideal that is designed to combine popular
responsiveness with a high degree of reflection and exchange among people
with competing views.' But for the most part, the resulting literature has not
been empirically informed.6 It has not dealt much with the real-world
consequences of deliberation, and with what generalizations hold in actual
deliberative settings, with groups of different predispositions and
compositions.
The standard view of deliberation is that of Hamilton and Rawls, as
quoted above. Group discussion is likely to lead to better outcomes, if only
because competing views are stated and exchanged. Aristotle spoke in
similar terms, suggesting that when diverse people
all come together ... they may surpass-collectively and as a body,
although not individually-the quality of the few best .... [Wihen
4. Sometimes it may seem that moral and political arguments are unlikely to have an effect
on individual judgments; the evidence discussed here shows that arguments often induce
considerable movement.
5. E.g., DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 128-64 (1996); JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS 287-328 (William Rehg trans., Polity Press 1996) (1992); CASs R. SUNSTEIN,
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 133-45 (1993).
6. Exceptions include James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 44; and Susan C. Stokes, Pathologies of Deliberation, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 123. Of special interest are James Fishkin's
continuing experiments with the "deliberative opinion poll," in which groups of diverse people
are asked to deliberate on public issues. See James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin, Bringing
Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue, in THE POLL WITH A HUMAN FACE 3 (Maxwell
McCombs & Amy Reynolds eds., 1999). Fishkin's groups do not polarize, at least not
systematically; this result is undoubtedly a product of the distinctive setting, in which materials
are presented on each issue, with corresponding claims of fact and value. For a discussion of
Fishkin, see infra text accompanying notes 193-203.
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there are many [who contribute to the process of deliberation], each
has his share of goodness and practical wisdom .... [S]ome
appreciate one part, some another, and all together appreciate all.'
But an important empirical question is whether and under what
circumstances it is really true that "some appreciate one part, some another,
and all together appreciate all."
My principal purpose in this Essay is to investigate a striking but
largely neglected8 statistical regularity-that of group polarization-and to
relate this phenomenon to underlying questions about the role of
deliberation in the "public sphere" 9 of a heterogeneous democracy. In
brief, group polarization means that members of a deliberating group
predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by
the members' predeliberation tendencies. 10 "[L]ike polarized molecules,
group members become even more aligned in the direction they were
7. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 108-09 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
8. Though the topic has been much studied within psychology, e.g., ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 200-48 (1986), 1 have been unable to find sustained
discussions in the relevant literature in economics, sociology, philosophy, law, or political
science, and there appears to be no treatment of the implications of group polarization for social
behavior or the theory of democracy. Within the economics literature, an exception is Timothy
Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game,
107 ECON. J. 1465 (1997), described by the authors as "the first study that attempts to incorporate
this psychological literature into economics." Id. at 1466. For one of the rare treatments within
sociology, see Noah E. Friedkin, Choice Shift and Group Polarization, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 856
(1999). Group polarization is also explored in Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five Years of Groups
Research: What We Have Learned and What Needs To Be Addressed, 17 J. MGMT. 345, 356-59
(1991).
There have been some valuable discussions of group polarization in the context of jury
deliberations. A 1976 jury simulation study, BROWN, supra, at 226-29, tests for, and finds, group
polarization, id. at 228; and a number of other mock jury studies, not intended to test for group
polarization, collect evidence that it occurred in "every instance where the report of data makes it
possible to check." Id. at 229; see also David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The
Severity Shift, 100 COLUJM. L. REV. 1139 (2000).
9. The term is associated with Jurgen Habermas. HABERMAS, supra note 5, at 360-87;
JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Thomas
Burger trans., Mass. Inst. of Tech. Press 1989) (1962).
10. Note that this statement has two different implications. First, a deliberating group, asked
to make a group decision, will shift toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the
median predeliberation judgment. Second, the tendency of individuals who compose a
deliberating group, if polled anonymously after discussion, will be to shift toward a more extreme
point in the direction indicated by the median predeliberation judgment. Frequently these two
phenomena are collapsed in the empirical literature, and I will not always distinguish between
them here. But for some purposes it is important to distinguish them, and hence some work refers
to the movement of groups as "choice shifts" and the movement of individuals as "group
polarization." E.g., Johannes A. Zuber et al., Choice Shift and Group Polarization: An Analysis of
the Status of Arguments and Social Decision Schemes, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 50,
50, 59 (1992). I discuss this distinction in more detail below. Infra text accompanying notes 64-
65.
Note also that in the experimental work, both extremism and tendencies are measured not by
reference to anything external, nor to a normative standard, but by reference to the particular scale
that is brought before the individuals who compose the group. Thus, for example, people might be
asked, on a scale of-5 to 5, how strongly they agree or disagree with a particular statement.
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already tending." " Thus, for example, members of the first deliberating
group are likely to become more firmly committed to affirmative action; the
second group will probably end up favoring gun control quite
enthusiastically; the punitive damages jury will likely come up with an
award higher than the median, perhaps higher than the average as well, and
very possibly as high as or higher than that of the highest predeliberation
award of any individual member; and the group of women concerned about
feminism is likely to become very conservative indeed on gender issues.
Notably, groups consisting of individuals with extremist tendencies are
more likely to shift, and likely to shift more; the same is true for groups
with some kind of salient shared identity (like Republicans, Democrats, and
lawyers, but unlike jurors and experimental subjects). 2 When like-minded
people are participating in "iterated polarization games" -when they meet
regularly, without sustained exposure to competing views-extreme
movements are all the more likely.
Two principal mechanisms underlie group polarization. The first points
to social influences on behavior and in particular to people's desire to
maintain their reputation and their self-conception. The second emphasizes
the limited "argument pools" within any group, and the directions in which
those limited pools lead group members. An understanding of the two
mechanisms provides many insights into deliberating bodies. Such an
understanding illuminates a great deal, for example, about likely processes
within multimember courts, juries, political parties, and legislatures-not to
mention ethnic groups, extremist organizations, criminal conspiracies,
student associations, faculties, institutions engaged in feuds or "turf
battles," workplaces, and families. At the same time, these mechanisms
raise serious questions about deliberation from the normative point of
view. 13 If deliberation predictably pushes groups toward a more extreme
point in the direction of their original tendency, whatever that tendency may
be, is there any reason to think that deliberation is producing
improvements?
One of my largest purposes is to cast light on enclave deliberation
as simultaneously a potential danger to social stability, a source of
social fragmentation, and a safeguard against social injustice and
unreasonableness.14 Group polarization helps explain an old point, with
11. JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP 142 (1987).
12. Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What To Think by Knowing Who You Are, 29 BRIT. J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 112 (1990).
13. I am speaking here of real-world deliberation, not of deliberation accompanied by
preconditions of the sort that have been identified by those thinking of it in ideal terms. See, e.g.,
HABERMAS, supra note 5, at 99-131.
14. On the last point, see the discussion of African-American newspapers in RONALD
JACOBS, RACE, MEDIA, AND THE CRISIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: FROM WATTS TO RODNEY KING
140-51 (2000).
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clear constitutional resonances, to the effect that social homogeneity can be
quite damaging to good deliberation. 5 When people are hearing echoes of
their own voices, the consequence may be far more than support and
reinforcement. An understanding of group polarization thus illuminates
social practices designed to reduce the risks of deliberation limited to like-
minded people. Consider the ban on single-party domination of independent
regulatory agencies, the requirement of legislative bicameralism, and
debates, within the United States and internationally, about the value of
proportional or group representation. Group polarization is naturally taken
as a reason for skepticism about enclave deliberation and for seeking to
ensure deliberation among a wide group of diverse people.
But there is a point more supportive of enclave deliberation:
Participants in heterogeneous groups tend to give least weight to the views
of low-status members16 in some times and places, women, African
Americans, less-educated people. Hence enclave deliberation might be the
only way to ensure that those views are developed and eventually heard.
Without a place for enclave deliberation, citizens in the broader public
sphere may move in certain directions, even extreme directions, precisely
because opposing voices are not heard at all. The ambivalent lesson is that
deliberating enclaves can be breeding grounds both for the development of
unjustly suppressed views and for unjustified extremism, indeed fanaticism.
This Essay is organized as follows. Part II discusses social influences
on individual judgments, with particular reference to the phenomenon of
social cascades. When a number of people have acted or spoken, observers
who lack much private information are highly likely to follow their lead, a
phenomenon that can drive participants in politics in unexpected and
sometimes extreme directions. Part III offers a basic account of group
polarization, with an elaboration of the underlying mechanisms of social
influence and persuasive arguments. Parts IV, V, and VI deal with the
implications of group polarization for democracy and law. Part IV is
descriptive; it explores the likely consequences of group polarization for a
number of issues at the intersection of law and democratic theory, including
feuds, ethnic strife, juries, commissions, multimember courts, and
deliberation via the Internet. Part V is normative; it draws the various
strands together in an effort to show how group polarization can create
deliberative trouble. It also traces the implications of the phenomenon for
structuring deliberative institutions and links group polarization to central
aspects of constitutional design. Part VI focuses on the role of deliberation
inside and outside enclaves of like-minded people, emphasizing the need to
15. For the constitutional resonances, see infra notes 164-165, 169-171.
16. Caryn Christensen & Ann S. Abbott, Team Medical Decision Making, in DECISION
MAKING IN HEALTH CARE 267, 273-76 (Gretchen Chapman & Frank Sonnenberg eds., 2000).
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ensure that members of deliberating enclaves are not walled off from other
points of view. Part VII is a brief conclusion.
II. SOCIAL INFLUENCES AND CASCADES
A. In General
A great deal of attention has recently been devoted to the topic of social
influences on individual behavior. 7 Because many of these influences are
analogous to what happens in group polarization, and because they have a
bearing on democratic deliberation as well, it is worthwhile to offer some
brief notations here.
Social influences can lead groups to go quite rapidly in identifiable
directions, often as a result of "cascade" effects involving either the spread
of information (whether true or false) or growing reputational pressure.
Sometimes cascade effects are highly localized, and lead members of
particular groups, quite rationally, to believe or to do something that
members of other groups, also quite rationally, find to be baseless or worse.
Local cascades can ensure that different groups end up with very different,
but equally entrenched, views about the same issues and events. 9
People frequently think and do what they think and do because of what
they think relevant others think and do.2" Thus, for example, employees are
more likely to file suit if members of the same work group have also done
so; 21 littering and nonlittering behavior appear to be contagious; 2 a good
way to increase the incidence of tax compliance is to inform people of high
17. E.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349 (1997). For extended overviews, see ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL (7th ed. 1995);
and LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION (1991). Group
polarization is a surprising omission from both of these lengthy and highly illuminating
treatments.
18. On the rationality of participation in a cascade, see David Hirschleifer, The Blind Leading
the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188, 189 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn lerulli eds., 1995).
19. For an entertaining and candid discussion, see the outline of attitudes of Microsoft
employees, by a Microsoft employee, in Michael Kinsley, The View from the Cafeteria: Microsoft
Employees Don't Recognize Themselves in the Government's Suit, TIME, Apr. 10, 2000, at 152,
2000 WL 17632849; the discussion can reasonably be taken to show both cascade effects and
group polarization.
20. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 17, at 28-57; Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard
Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000); Kahan, supra note 17.
21. Harold H. Gardner et al., Workers' Compensation and Family and Medical Leave Act
Claim Contagion, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 89, 101-10 (2000).
22. Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept
of Norms To Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1017
(1990).
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levels of voluntary tax compliance;23 television networks tend to follow one
another; 4 and students are less likely to engage in binge drinking if they
think that most of their fellow students do not engage in binge drinking, so
much so that disclosure of low numbers of binge drinkers is one of the few
successful methods of reducing binge drinking on college campuses."
Social influences affect behavior via two different mechanisms.26 The
first is informational. What other people do, or say, carries an informational
externality;27 if many other people support a particular candidate, or refuse
to use drugs, or carry guns, observers, and particularly observers within a
common group, are given a signal about what it makes sense to do. The
second mechanism is reputational, as group members impose sanctions on
perceived deviants, and would-be deviants anticipate the sanctions in
advance.28 Even when people do not believe that what other people do
provides information about what actually should be done, they may think
that the actions of others provide information about what other people think
should be done. Thus each person's expressive actions come with a
reputational externality. People care about their reputations and they have
an incentive to do what (they think) other group members think they should
do. For example, reputational considerations may lead people to obey or not
to obey the law, urge a certain view in group discussions, buy certain cars,29
drive while drunk, help others, or talk about political issues in a certain
way. A concern for reputation exerts a ubiquitous influence on behavior,
including that of participants in democratic debate, who often shift their
public statements in accordance with reputational incentives.3°
23. STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP'T OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT STATE TAX RESULTS 1, 5-6, 18-19 (1996), http://www.state.mn.us/
ebranchlmdor/reports/compliance/pdf.24. Robert E. Kennedy, Strategy Fads and Competitive Convergence: An Empirical Test for
Herd Behavior in Prime-Time Television Programming (Aug. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with The Yale Law Journal).
25. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 683, 767 (1999); H. Wesley Perkins, College Student Misperceptions of Alcohol and
Other Drug Norms Among Peers: Exploring Causes, Consequences, and Implications for
Prevention Programs 177, 194, in U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DESIGNING ALCOHOL AND OTHER
DRUG PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE
(1997), available at http://www.edc.org/hec/pubs/theorybook/perkins.pdf. A good outline of
contagion effects can be found in Gardner et al., supra note 21, at 91-93.
26. E.g., ARONSON, supra note 17, at 22; ROSS & NISBETr, supra note 17, at 44-45.
27. Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and
Search, 108 ECON. J. 60, 61 (1998).
28. GEORGE A. AKERLOF, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One
Consequence, in AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES 69 (1984).
29. See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 8-10, 122-45 (1999) (connecting luxury
purchases to competition for better relative position). This is only part of Frank's account; he also
emphasizes the "frame of reference" created by most people's decisions. Id. at 131-32.
30. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 691-703, 715-35 (discussing the relationship
between certain cascades and democratic politics). See generally TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE
TRUTH, PUBLIC LIES 3-21 (1995) (discussing preference falsification because of public
pressures).
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B. Some Classic Experiments
In the most vivid experiments involving group influences, conducted by
Solomon Asch, individuals were apparently willing to abandon the direct
evidence of their own senses.31 In the relevant experiments, a certain line
was placed on a large white card. The task of the subjects was to match that
line by choosing, as identical to it in length, one of three other lines that had
been placed on a separate large white card. One of the lines on the second
white card was in fact identical in length to the line to be matched to it; the
other two were substantially different, with the differential varying from an
inch and three-quarters to three-quarters of an inch. The subject in the
original experiments was one of eight people asked to engage in the
matching. Unbeknownst to the subject, the other people apparently being
tested were actually there as Asch's confederates, serving as part of the
experiments.
In the first two rounds of the experiment, everyone agreed about the
right answer; this seemed to be an extremely dull experiment. But the third
round introduced "an unexpected disturbance. ' 32 Other group members
made what was obviously, to the subject and to any reasonable person, a
clear error. They matched the line at issue to one that was obviously longer
or shorter. In these circumstances the subject had the choice of maintaining
his independent judgment or instead yielding to the crowd. A large number
of people ended up yielding. In ordinary circumstances, subjects erred less
than 1% of the time, but in rounds in which group pressure supported the
incorrect answer, subjects erred 36.8% of the time.33 Indeed, in a series of
twelve questions, no fewer than 70% of subjects went along with the group,
and defied the evidence of their own senses, at least once.
Susceptibility to group influence was hardly uniform. Some people
agreed with the group almost all of the time, whereas others were entirely
independent in their judgments. Significantly, a modest variation in the
experimental conditions made all the difference. The existence of at least
one compatriot, or voice of sanity, dramatically reduced both conformity
and error. When just one other person made an accurate match, errors were
reduced by three-quarters, even if there was a strong majority the other
way.34 By contrast, varying the size of the group unanimously making the
erroneous decision mattered only up to a number of three; increases from
that point had little effect. Opposition from one person did not increase
subjects' errors at all; opposition from two people increased error to 13.6%;
31. For an overview, see Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in READINGS
ABOUT THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 13 (Elliot Aronson ed., 1995).
32. Id. at 15.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 18.
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
and opposition from three people increased error to 31.8%, not substantially
different from the level that emerged from further increases in group size.
More recent studies have identified an important feature of social
influence, directly bearing on group behavior in democracies. Much
depends on the subject's perceived relationship to the experimenters'
confederates and in particular on whether the subject considers himself part
of the same group in which those confederates fall. Thus conformity-and
error-is dramatically increased in public statements when the subject
perceives himself as part of a reasonably discrete group that includes the
experimenter's confederates (all psychology majors, for example). 5 By
contrast, conformity is dramatically decreased, and hence error is also
dramatically decreased, in public statements when the subject perceives
himself as in a different group from the experimenter's confederates (all
ancient history majors, for example).36 Notably, private opinions, expressed
anonymously afterwards, were about the same whether or not the subject
perceived himself as a member of the same group as others in the
experiment. Apparently, public statements of agreement with a majority
view are particularly likely to be both inaccurate and insincere when
relevant speakers identify themselves as members of the same group as the
majority.37
Both informational and reputational considerations appear to lead
people toward the relevant errors. In Asch's own studies several people
said, in private interviews, that their own opinions must have been wrong.38
On the other hand, these statements may have been an effort to avoid the
dissonance that would come from confessing that the statement was false
but made only for reputational reasons. Notably, experimenters find greatly
reduced error when the subject is asked to give a purely private answer.39
And in the study described in the immediately preceding paragraph, people
who thought that they were members of the same group as the
35. Abrams et al., supra note 12, at 106-08. See also the discussion of the "downside" of
social ties among group members in Brooke Harrington, Cohesion, Conflict and Group
Demography (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal), which shows
that when social ties are in place, dissent may be suppressed and decisions may be worse as a
result.
36. Abrams et al., supra note 12, at 106-08.
37. The least conformity, and the greatest accuracy, were found when people who thought of
themselves as being in a different group were speaking publicly. At the same time, the largest
number of conforming, inaccurate responses came when people thought of themselves as being in
the same group and were speaking publicly-even though the number of inaccurate private
responses in that experimental condition was not notably higher than in other conditions. Id. at
108.
38. Asch, supra note 31, at 17.
39. ARONSON, supra note 17, at 23-24.
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experimenter's confederates gave far more accurate answers, and far less
conforming answers, when they were speaking privately.40
Asch concluded that his results raised the possibility that "the social
process is polluted" by the "dominance of conformity.... That we have
found the tendency to conformity in our society so strong that reasonably
intelligent and well-meaning young people are willing to call white black is
a matter of concern." 41 Asch's experiments did not involve deliberation, for
people were not exchanging reasons; indeed, one might expect that reason-
giving on the part of Asch's confederates would have lessened the amount
of conformity and error. What reasons could have been given for incorrect
matches? But the existence of substantial numbers of mistakes as a result of
mere exposure to the incorrect conclusions of others raises questions about
whether and when deliberation within groups will lead people in the right
directions.
C. Social and Law-Related Cascades
A great deal of recent work on social influence has raised the
possibility of informational and reputational "cascades" ;42 this work has
obvious relevance to law and politics.43 (Consider issues involving race and
sex equality, global warming, capital punishment, AIDS, the filing of
lawsuits, or presidential candidates.) Indeed, Asch's work demonstrates
considerable individual susceptibility to cascade effects. What is striking
about such effects is their epidemic-like nature, or the quality of apparent
contagion. Group polarization is sometimes, but not always, a product of
cascade effects. It is useful to understand the former against the background
of the latter.
40. Abrams et al., supra note 12, at 108. By contrast, people who thought that they were
members of a different group actually gave more accurate, nonconforming answers when
speaking publicly, which creates an interesting puzzle: Why was there more accuracy in public
than in private statements? The puzzle is solved by considering the likelihood that subjects could
consider it an affirmative good to disagree with people from another group (even if they secretly
suspected that those people might be right). In the real world, this effect may well be heightened
when people are asked whether they agree with opponents or antagonists; they might well say
"no" even when the answer is "yes," simply because agreement carries costs, either to reputation
or to self-conception.
41. Asch, supra note 31, at 21.
42. E.g., Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory,
87 Am. ECON. REV. 847 (1997); Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J.
ECON. 797 (1992); Sushil Biikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others:
Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998); Andrew F.
Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding
Behavior by Courts, I AM. L. & EcON. REV. 158, 159-65 (1999).
43. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 763-67.
20001
The Yale Law Journal
1. Informational Cascades
When individuals lack a great deal of private information (and
sometimes even when they have such information), they rely on
information provided by the statements or actions of others. If A is unaware
whether abandoned toxic waste dumps are in fact hazardous, he may be
moved in the direction of fear if B seems to think that fear is justified. If A
and B both believe that fear is justified, C may end up thinking so too, at
least if she lacks reliable independent information to the contrary. If A, B,
and C believe that abandoned toxic waste dumps are hazardous, D will need
a good deal of confidence to reject their shared conclusion.
People typically have different thresholds for choosing to believe or do
something new or different. As those with low thresholds come to a certain
belief or action, people with somewhat higher thresholds join them,
possibly to a point where a critical mass is reached, making groups,
possibly even nations, "tip."" The result of this process can be to produce
snowball or cascade effects, as small or even large groups of people end up
believing something-even if that something is false-simply because
other people seem to believe that it is true. There is a great deal of
experimental evidence of informational cascades, which are easy to induce
in the laboratory;45 real-world phenomena also seem to have a great deal to
do with cascade effects.' Consider, for example, smoking, participating in
protests, striking, rioting, buying stocks,47 choosing what to put on
television," even leaving bad dinner parties. 9
Though the cascades phenomenon has been discussed largely in
connection with factual judgments, the same processes should be at work
for political, legal, and moral questions. Suppose, for example, that A
believes that affirmative action is wrong and even unconstitutional, that B is
otherwise in equipoise but shifts upon hearing what A believes, and that C
44. Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC. 1420, 1441-
42 (1978). For a recent popular treatment, see MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 5-22
(2000).
45. See generally Anderson & Holt, supra note 42.
46. See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change
as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 25, at
715-35.
47. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 151-67 (2000).
48. Kennedy, supra note 24.
49. Several of these examples are discussed in Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 725-35;
and Granovetter, supra note 44, at 1422-24. With respect to AIDS, unfortunate and literally
deadly cascade effects can be found in South Africa. President Mbeke's widely publicized doubts
about a connection between AIDS and HIV came from learning about the views of "denialists" as
a result of surfing the Internet. Thomas H. Maugh II, AIDS Researchers Meet at Ground Zero,
L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2000, at Al, 2000 WL 2258962. In addition, many myths have spread,
suggesting, for example, that there is a "miracle cure" and that organic food is a shield or a cure.
See Donald G. McNeil Jr., South Africa: Aw C'mon, You Don't Really Believe Those AIDS Myths,
AFRICA NEWS, June 11, 1999, 1999 WL 19530508.
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is unwilling to persist in his modest approval of affirmative action when A
and B disapprove of it. It would be a very confident D who would reject the
judgments of three (apparently) firmly committed others. Sometimes people
are not entirely sure whether capital punishment should be imposed,
whether the Constitution protects the right to have an abortion, whether it is
wrong to litter or to smoke. Many people, lacking firm convictions of their
own, end up believing what relevant others seem to believe.
Judges are also vulnerable to cascade effects.5" The same process is
sometimes at work for the choice of political candidates, as a fad develops
in favor of one or another-a cascade "up" or "down," with sensational or
ruinous consequences. One can easily imagine cascade effects in the
direction of certain judgments about the appropriate course of government
regulation, the minimum wage, or even constitutional law; indeed, such
effects seem to have been at work in the legal culture in the 1960s (with
mounting enthusiasm for the Warren Court) and the 1980s (with mounting
skepticism about that Court). It is even possible to imagine cascade effects
with respect to questions of constitutional method (for example, textualism,
originalism, democracy-reinforcing judicial review). Note that a
precondition for an informational cascade is a lack of much private
information on the part of many or most people. If people have a good deal
of private information, or are confident about their own judgments, they are
unlikely to be susceptible to the signals sent by the actions of others."
2. Reputational Cascades
There can be reputational pressures and reputational cascades as well,52
in which people speak out, or remain silent, or even engage in certain
expressive activity, partly in order to preserve their reputations, at the price
of failing to say what they really think. Suppose, for example, that A
believes that hazardous waste dumps pose a serious environmental
problem; suppose too that B is skeptical. B might keep quiet, or (like some
of Asch's subjects) even agree with A, simply in order to preserve A's good
opinion. C might see that A believes that hazardous waste dumps pose a
serious problem and that B seems to agree with A; C might therefore voice
agreement even though privately she is skeptical or ambivalent.
It is easy to see how this kind of thing might happen in political life-
with, for example, politicians expressing their commitment to capital
punishment (even if they are privately skeptical) or their belief in God
50. See Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 42, at 167-82 (discussing the possibility of herd
behavior by courts).
51. This point has an echo in findings on group polarization, as those with entrenched views
are less likely to "move" as a result of discussion. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99.
52. KURAN, supra note 30, at 4-21.
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(even if they are privately agnostic). People typically have different
thresholds for yielding to perceived reputational pressure. Some people
follow perceived pressure only when it is very severe (for example, because
a large number of people impose it), whereas others will follow when it is
mild (for example, simply because some relevant others impose it). Here
too the consequence can be cascade effects-large social movements in one
direction or another-as increasing numbers of people yield to a pressure
that they simultaneously impose, eventually reaching a critical mass. At that
stage, a large number of people eventually appear to support a certain
course of action simply because others (appear to) do so.
As in the context of the informational cascade, what is true for factual
beliefs may be true as well for moral, legal, and political judgments. People
might say, for example, that affirmative action violates the Constitution
simply because of perceived reputational sanctions from saying the
opposite; they might support or oppose the death penalty largely in order to
avoid the forms of social opprobrium that might come, in the relevant
community, from taking the opposing view. A precondition for reputational
cascades is that in making the decision at issue, reputational considerations
loom large. If people do not care about their reputations, or if reputation is a
small component of the choice involved, the perceived intrinsic merits will
be crucial, and cascades are unlikely to result.
Are social cascades good or bad? No general answer would make
sense. Sometimes cascades are quite fragile, precisely because people's
commitments are based on little private information; sometimes cascades
are rooted in (and greatly fuel) blunders. Sometimes cascade effects will
eliminate group or public torpor by generating concern about serious
though previously ignored problems. But sometimes cascade effects will
make people far more worried than they should be, or otherwise produce
large-scale distortions in private judgments, public policy, and law. It is
reasonable to speculate that both the antislavery and the Nazi movements
had distinctive cascade-like features, as did the environmental movement in
the United States and the fall of communism." The serious risk with social
cascades, both informational and reputational, is that they can lead to
widespead errors, factual or otherwise. Cascades need not involve
deliberation, but related problems infect processes of group deliberation, as
I show below.
53. See Susanne Lohmann, The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday
Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91, 47 WORLD POL. 42, 76 (1994).
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11. How AND WHY GROUPS POLARIZE
How do small groups of like-minded people differ from large groups of
heterogeneous people? What is likely to happen within isolated deliberating
enclaves? How does all this bear on deliberative democracy? To answer
these questions, and to understand the relationship between social processes
within groups 54 and democratic theory, it is necessary to have an
understanding of group polarization.
A. The Basic Phenomenon
Group polarization is among the most robust patterns found in
deliberating bodies, and it has been found in many diverse tasks.
Polarization "is said to occur when an initial tendency of individual group
members toward a given direction is enhanced following group
discussion."55 The result is that groups often make more extreme decisions
than would the typical or average individual in the group (where "extreme"
is defined solely internally, by reference to the group's initial dispositions).
There is a clear relationship between group polarization and cascade
effects: Both have a great deal to do with informational and reputational
influences. An important difference is that group polarization, unlike
cascade effects, involves deliberation. In addition, polarization may or may
not involve a cascade-like process; polarization can result simply from
simultaneous independent decisions to move toward the group extreme.
Though standard, the term "group polarization" is somewhat
misleading. It is not meant to suggest that group members will shift to two
poles, nor does it refer to an increase in variance among groups, though this
may be the ultimate result. 6 Instead the term refers to a predictable shift
within a group discussing a case or problem. As the shift occurs, groups and
group members move and coalesce, not toward the middle of antecedent
dispositions, but toward a more extreme position in the direction indicated
by those dispositions. The effect of deliberation is both to decrease variance
among group members, as individual differences diminish, and also to
54. I do not deal here with the general and related question whether groups amplify or
eliminate various cognitive and motivational biases in individual decisions. For a general
overview, finding mixed results, see Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing
Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996).
55. Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J.
PERSONALrIY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1141, 1141 (1986).
56. When different deliberating groups polarize in different directions, the consequence can
be greater variance among groups, notwithstanding small initial differences. A group whose
members are initially but tentatively disposed to reject some proposal might start out very close to
a group whose members are initially but tentatively disposed to approve of that proposal. If the
two groups have a number of intragroup discussions, but no intergroup discussions, they may end
up very far apart.
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produce convergence on a relatively more extreme point among
predeliberation judgments.
The basic phenomenon has been found in many nations. 7 Consider
some examples:
" After discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the
United States and its intentions with respect to economic aid. 8
" A group of moderately profeminist women becomes more
strongly profeminist after discussion. 9
* As a result of deliberation, whites predisposed to greater racial
prejudice offer more negative responses to the question of
whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced by
African Americans in American cities.6"
* After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial
prejudice offer more positive responses to the same question.6
In all of these cases, deliberation moves people toward a more extreme
point in line with their predeliberation positions. 62
B. Risky Shifts and Cautious Shifts
Group polarization was first found in a series of experiments involving
risk-taking decisions. These experiments found what has become known as
the "risky shift." 63 In the original experiments, male graduate students of
57. BROWN, supra note 8, at 222-26. These include the United States, England, and France.
See also, e.g., Abrams et al., supra note 12, at 112 (New Zealand); Zuber et al., supra note 10
(Germany). Of course, it is possible that some cultures would show a greater or lesser tendency
toward polarization; this would be an extremely interesting area for empirical study.
58. BROWN, supra note 8, at 224.
59. David G. Myers, Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 HuM. REL. 699, 710-12
(1975).
60. BROWN, supra note 8, at 224 (discussing a study in David G. Myers & George D. Bishop,
The Enhancement of Dominant Attitudes in Group Discussion, 20 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 386 (1971)).
61. Id.
62. In laboratory studies, polarization occurs in terms of a specified issue and a specified
scale. Thus any tendency toward extremism is scale-relative; it need not mean extremism as a
normative matter, or across a full population. In the real world, political entrepreneurs, with self-
interested or altruistic agendas, are in some sense aware of the importance of the scale at issue,
and attempt to produce shifts along the scale that has been self-consciously made salient. The
salient scales (" Do you approve of quotas?" as opposed to "Do you believe in remedial steps for
traditionally disadvantaged groups?") can be extremely important.
63. BROWN, supra note 8, at 248 (citing J.A.F. Stoner, A Comparison of Individual and
Group Decisions Including Risk (1961) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology) (on file with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Library)); James A.F. Stoner,
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industrial management were asked a range of questions involving risk. For
twelve of the thirteen groups, the group decisions showed a repeated pattern
toward greater risk-taking. After discussion, for example, the unanimous
outcome assessed the acceptable probability of financial soundness as
consistently lower than the median judgment of group members prior to
deliberation. In addition, there was a clear shift toward greater risk-taking
in private opinions. This shift-the "risky" shift-was promptly duplicated
in a number of diverse studies, some involving all men and some involving
all women.
It is important to distinguish at this point between two aspects of these
findings 64 usually not separated in the psychological literature and both
relevant to law and policy. The first involves the movement of deliberating
groups, when a group decision is necessary, toward the group's extreme
end; call this a choice shift. This means that if a group decision is required,
the group will tend toward an extreme point, given the original distribution
of individual views. Undoubtedly the group's decision rule will matter here;
a requirement of unanimity, for example, may well produce a shift toward
the most extreme points, at least if those with the most extreme views are
least tractable and most confident. The second involves the movement of
(even private) individual judgments as a result of group influence; call this
simply (as is standard) group polarization. This means that to the extent that
the private judgments of individuals are moved by discussion, the
movement will be toward a more extreme point in the direction set by the
original distribution of views. It is possible to have one kind of movement
without the other, though ordinarily the two accompany one another 5 as
with risky shifts.
Studies have shown that under certain conditions, it is possible, even
easy, to induce a "cautious shift" as well. Indeed, certain problems reliably
produce cautious shifts." The principal examples involve the decision
whether to marry and the decision whether to board a plane despite severe
abdominal pain possibly requiring medical attention. In these cases,
deliberating groups move toward caution, as do the members who compose
them. Burglars, in fact, show cautious shifts in discussions, though when
they work together, the tendency is toward greater risk-taking.67
In Stoner's original data, researchers noticed that the largest risky shifts
could be found when group members "had a quite extreme risky initial
Risky and Cautious Shifts in Group Decisions, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 442 (1968). In
this and the following paragraph, I draw from BROWN, supra note 8, at 200-06.
64. For an insistence on this distinction, see Zuber et al., supra note 10, at 50, 59.
65. Id. at 59 ("[I]t is necessary to differentiate between choice shift and group
polarization .... [T]he ongoing processes at these two levels may differ.").
66. See BROWN, supra note 8, at 208-10, for an overview.
67. Paul F. Cromwell et al., Group Effects on Decision-Making by Burglars, 69 PSYCHOL.
REP. 579, 586 (1991).
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position," in the sense that the predeliberation votes were weighted toward
the risky end, whereas the items "that shifted a little or not at all started out
near the middle of the scale."6 Thus the direction of the shift seemed to
turn on the location of the original disposition, and the size of the shift
depended on the extremeness of that original disposition. Similar results
have been found in many contexts relevant to law and democracy,
involving, for example, questions about economic aid, architecture,
education, political leaders, race, and judgments of guilt or innocence.69
Polarization has been found for questions of obscure fact as well as for
evaluative questions, including political and legal issues7 ° and even the
attractiveness of people in slides.7'
C. Mechanisms
What explains group polarization? It is tempting to think that
conformity plays a large role, and as the Asch experiments suggest,
individual judgments can be greatly influenced by the desire to conform.
Perhaps conformity is sometimes at work, but the data make it clear that
group polarization is not a matter of conformity; people do not shift to the
mean of initial positions.72 The relevant movement goes to one or another
side. Indeed, this is what defines, and what is most distinctive about, group
polarization.
There have been two main explanations for group polarization. Both of
these have been extensively investigated and supported.73 The first
explanation of group polarization-social comparison-begins with the
claim that people want to be perceived favorably by other group members
and also to perceive themselves favorably. Most people seek to take a
position of a certain socially preferred sort. In the case of risk-taking, for
example, they may want to be perceived (and to perceive themselves) as
daring risk-takers, and their choice of position is partly a product of these
68. BROWN, supra note 8, at 211.
69. Id. at 224, 226-27.
70. A relatively recent treatment is Russell Spears et al., De-Individuation and Group
Polarization in Computer-Mediated Communication, 29 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 121 (1990).
71. TURNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 153.
72. BROWN, supra note 8, at 207-08. Note, however, that one account of group polarization
finds that the effect lies in conformity to the "prototypical group member," defined as such by
reference to a "meta-contrast principle: the less a person differs from in-group members and the
more he or she differs from out-group members, the more representative is he or she of the in-
group." Craig McGarty et al., Group Polarization as Conformity to the Prototypical Group
Member, 31 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (1992). This position raises many questions; it seems to
have the strongest fit with the data in cases in which in-groups and out-groups can readily be
understood as such by subjects. See id.
73. BROWN, supra note 8, at 210-29, and Isenberg, supra note 55, review this literature; see




desires.74 No one can know what the desirable position would be until the
positions of others are revealed. 5 People move their judgments in order to
preserve their image to others and their image to themselves. Evidence
confirms that mere exposure to the positions of others, without discussion,
induces a substantial risky shift (though this shift is only about half as large
as the shift produced by discussion).7 6 This effect helps explain a shift
toward caution (the "cautious shift") as well.77
The second explanation is based on the commonsense intuition that any
individual's position on an issue is partly a function of which arguments
presented within the group seem convincing. The choice therefore moves in
the direction of the most persuasive position defended by the group, taken
as a whole. Because a group whose members are already inclined in a
certain direction will have a disproportionate number of arguments going in
that same direction, the result of discussion will be to move people further
in the direction of their initial inclinations. The key is the existence of a
limited argument pool, one that is skewed (speaking purely descriptively) in
a particular direction.78 Hence there will be a shift in the direction of the
74. For a quite vivid demonstration of a related process in the enactment of the Clean Air
Act-one that does not, however, identify the mechanisms discussed here-see E. Donald Elliott
et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985).
75. Brown notes:
Once the real location of the mean was known, should it not be the case, granting that
everyone wanted to see himself as reasonably audacious, that those who were really
below the mean would be motivated to adopt riskier positions and so change the mean
and produce the risky shift?
BROWN, supra note 8, at 214.
76. Allan I. Teger & Dean G. Pruitt, Components of Group Risk Taking, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1967).
77. One might point here to both one-upsmanship and the removal of pluralistic ignorance,
that is, ignorance of what other people think (or are willing to say they think). It is implicit in
these findings that people seem to want not to conform, but to be different from others in a
desirable way. While highly suggestive, however, the "mere exposure" finding does not confirm
the social influence account; it is possible that the views of others simply provide an informational
signal, quite apart from arguments, and hence that people move not in order to maintain
reputation, but to do what is right.
78. The phenomenon of group polarization may seem to raise doubts about rational actor
models in economics or law. (On those models generally, see GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING
FOR TASTES (1996); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).) But
individual behavior within groups, as described thus far, should create no such doubts. It is
certainly rational to make assessments on the basis of arguments offered; if the most numerous
and convincing arguments seem to justify a shift, individual shifts are entirely rational. More
difficult questions might seem to be raised by "social influence" accounts of group polarization.
But it is also rational for people to care about their reputations. If they change their assessment
because of reputational considerations, then maintaining a certain reputation is simply part of
what people care about (and there is nothing irrational about that). If people shift not for
reputational reasons but because of a certain self-conception-if, for example, they think of
themselves as people who are bold, or committed to a strong national defense, or left of center on
issues of race-a change in position, after exposure to the views of others, also seems entirely
rational.
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original tilt.79
There is a related possibility, not quite reducible to either of the two
standard arguments, but incorporating elements of each. In their individual
judgments, people are averse to extremes; they tend to seek the middle of
the relevant poles.8° It is possible that when people are making judgments
individually, they err on the side of caution, expressing a view in the
direction that they really hold, but stating that view cautiously, for fear of
seeming extreme. Once other people express supportive views, the relevant
inhibition disappears, and people feel free to say what, in a sense, they
really believe. There appears to be no direct test of this hypothesis, but it is
reasonable to believe that the phenomenon plays a role in group
polarization and choice shifts.8"
D. Refinements-and Depolarization
I now turn to some refinements that complicate the basic account of
group polarization. First, it matters a great deal whether people consider
themselves part of the same social group as the other members. A sense of
shared identity heightens the shift, and a belief that identity is not shared
reduces and sometimes eliminates it. Second, deliberating groups tend to
depolarize if they consist of equally opposed subgroups and if members
have a degree of flexibility in their positions. Both of these findings have
great relevance to any account of the relationship between group
polarization and democratic institutions, as Part V shows.
1. Statistical Regularities
Of course, not all groups polarize. If the people defending the original
tendency are particularly unpersuasive, group polarization is unlikely to
79. BROWN, supra note 8, at 219-20. An experimental study (on willingness to sacrifice
money for the sake of fairness) has found support for the social influence explanation but not for
the persuasive arguments explanation. Cason & Mui, supra note 8, at 1476-78.
80. See, e.g., Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 78, at 61, 71-76 (discussing, inter alia, findings
that the same option is evaluated more favorably when it is seen as the intermediate choice within
a range of options).
81. A related possibility is that hearing other similar opinions produces greater confidence in
individual positions, opening members to more extreme judgments in the same direction. This
possibility has been raised by Heath and Gonzalez. Chip Heath & Rich Gonzalez, Interaction with
Others Increases Decision Confidence but Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information
Collection Views of Interactive Decision Making, 61 ORG. BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 305, 318-19 (1995).
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occur. If the outliers are especially convincing, groups may even shift away
from their original tendency and in the direction held by few or even one.82
Sometimes, moreover, external constraints or an external "shock" may
prevent or blunt group polarization. Group members with well-defined
views on a certain issue may be prone to polarization, but in order to
maintain political effectiveness, even basic credibility, they will sometimes
present a relatively moderate face, publicly or even privately. Groups that
have started to polarize may move toward the middle in order to promote
their own legitimacy or because of new revelations of one kind or another.
Perhaps something like this happened with the Democratic Party in the
early 1990s and the Republican Party in the late 1990s.
2. Affective Factors and the Role of Confidence
Affective factors are quite important in group decisions, and when
manipulated, such factors will significantly increase or decrease
polarization. If group members are linked by affective ties, dissent is
significantly less frequent.8 3 The existence of affective ties thus reduces the
number of divergent arguments and also intensifies social influences on
choice. Hence people are less likely to shift if the direction advocated is
being pushed by unfriendly group members; the likelihood of a shift, and its
likely size, are increased when people perceive fellow members as friendly,
likeable, and similar to them." In the same vein, physical spacing tends to
reduce polarization; a sense of common fate and intragroup similarity tends
to increase it, as does the introduction of a rival "outgroup." 5 Mistakes are
thus likely to be increased when group members are united mostly through
82. This is of course the plot of the movie Twelve Angry Men, in which the single holdout,
played by Henry Fonda, shifts the judgment of the jury. See TWELVE ANGRY MEN (United Artists
1957), see also BROWN, supra note 8, at 229-39 (discussing the movie's psychological realism).
83. Brooke Harrington, The Pervasive Effects of Embeddedness in Organizations 23-24
(1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
84. Hermann Brandstttter, Social Emotions in Discussion Groups, in DYNAMICS OF GROUP
DECISIONS 93, 93-97, 106-08 (Hermann Brandstatter et al. eds., 1978). In TURNER ET AL., supra
note I1, at 154-59, the authors attempt to use this evidence as a basis for a new synthesis, one that
they call "a self-categorization theory of group polarization." Id. at 154. In this account,
"persuasion is dependent upon self-categorizations which create a common identity within a
group" and polarization occurs "because group members adjust their opinion in line with their
image of the group position (conform) and more extreme, already polarized, prototypical
responses determine this image." Id. at 156. When a group is leaning in a certain direction, the
perceived "prototype" is determined by where the group is leaning, and this is where individuals
will shift. Id. For possible differences in predictions, and supporting evidence, see id. at 158-70.
An especially interesting implication, perhaps in some tension with the persuasive arguments
theory, is that a group of comparative extremists will show a comparatively greater shift toward
extremism. Id. at 158.
85. Id. at 151.
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affective ties, and not through concentration on a particular task; it is in the
former case that alternative views will less likely find expression.86
The confidence of particular members also plays an important role.87
Indeed, part of the reason for group polarization appears to be that as a
class, extreme positions tend to be more confidently held. This point
is an important complement to the persuasive arguments theory: The
persuasiveness of arguments depends not simply on the grounds given, but
also on the confidence with which they are articulated. Group polarization
can also be fortified through "exit," as members leave the group because
they reject the direction in which things are heading. If exit is pervasive, the
tendency to extremism will be aggravated.
3. Identity and Solidarity
If people think of themselves as part of a group having a degree of
solidarity, group polarization is all the more likely, and it is likely to
be more extreme.88 Thus when the context emphasizes each person's
membership in the social group engaging in deliberation, polarization
increases.89 This finding is in line with more general evidence that social
ties among deliberating group members tend to suppress dissent and in that
way to lead to inferior decisions.9" This should not be surprising. If ordinary
findings of group polarization are a product of social influences and limited
argument pools, it stands to reason that when group members think of one
another as similar along a salient dimension, or if some external factor (for
example, politics, geography, race, or sex) unites them, group polarization
is heightened. 9' Considerable evidence so suggests.92
4. Depolarization and Deliberation Without Shifts
Is it possible to construct either groups that will depolarize-that will
tend toward the middle--or groups whose members will not shift at all?
Both phenomena seem to be real in actual deliberating bodies. In fact, the
persuasive arguments theory implies, and evidence demonstrates, that there
is depolarization if and when new persuasive arguments are offered that are
86. Harrington, supra note 35, at 26.
87. Maryla Zaleska, The Stability of Extreme and Moderate Responses in Different
Situations, in GROUP DECISION MAKING 163, 164 (Hermann Brandstatter et al. eds., 1982).
88. WALLACE, supra note 3, at 73-76; Abrams et al., supra note 12, at 113-16; Spears et al.,
supra note 70, at 130-31.
89. Spears ct al., supra note 70, at 122-24.
90. Harrington, supra note 83, at 26.
91. See the illuminating remarks on herd behavior, repression, and social identity in
AMARTYA SEN, REASON BEFORE IDENTITY 19-22 (1999).
92. TURNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 159-62; Abrams et al., supra note 12, at 98-99; Spears
et al., supra note 70, at 123-24, 130-3 1.
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opposite to the direction initially favored by group members.
Depolarization, rather than polarization, also occurs when a group consists
of individuals drawn equally from two extremes.93 If people who initially
favor caution are put together with people who initially favor risk-taking,
the group judgment will move toward the middle.
Group members with extreme but not fixed positions sometimes shift to
a more moderate position.94 Consider a study consisting of six-member
groups specifically designed to contain two subgroups, each consisting of
three people initially committed to opposed extremes. 95 The effect of
discussion was to produce movement toward the center. One reason may be
the existence of persuasive arguments in both directions.96 A study of
opposed subgroups found the greatest depolarization with obscure matters
of fact (for example, how far below sea level is the town of Sodom)-and
the least depolarization with highly visible public questions (for example,
whether capital punishment is justified). Matters of personal taste
depolarized a moderate amount (for example, preference for basketball or
football, or for colors for painting a room).97
These findings fit well with the persuasive arguments account of
polarization. Note too that when people have a fixed view of some highly
salient public issue, they are likely to have heard a wide range of arguments
in various directions, producing a full argument pool, and additional
discussion is not likely to produce movement. "[Flamiliar and long-debated
issues do not depolarize easily."9 With respect to such issues, people are
less likely to shift at all. And when one or more people in a group know the
right answer to a factual question, the group is likely to shift in the direction
of accuracy."
5. Several Regularities
These remarks suggest some general, commonsense conclusions about
how and when group discussion will move predeliberation opinions. Views
based on a great deal of thought are least likely to shift; depolarization can
occur with equal subgroups tending in opposite directions; groups will
usually shift in the direction of an accurate factual judgment where one or
93. Eugene Burnstein, Persuasion as Argument Processing, in GROUP DECISION MAKING,
supra note 87, at 103, 107-11.
94. Duncan A. Ferguson & Neil Vidmar, Effects of Group Discussion on Estimates of
Culturally Appropriate Risk Levels, 20 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 436, 443-44 (1971).
95. BROWN, supra note 8, at 225.
96. Aniram Vinokur & Eugene Bumstein, Effects of Partially Shared Persuasive Arguments
on Group-Induced Shifts: A Group-Problem-Solving Approach, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 305, 314 (1974).
97. Burnstein, supra note 93, at 111-12.
98. BROWN, supra note 8, at 226,
99. See Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 6, at 29-30.
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more members knows the truth; where views are not firmly held, but where
there is an initial predisposition, group polarization is the general rule. The
effects of discussion are also likely to depend on members' perception of
the group and of their relationship to it. If a group consists of "people," less
polarization is likely than if it consists of "Republicans" or "defenders of
the Second Amendment" or "opponents of American imperialism."
Depolarization may well occur in groups with equal subgroups having
opposite tendencies. But this is less likely and less pronounced if
(1) subgroup members have fixed positions, and (2) subgroup members
know that they are members of identifiable groups, and that their co-
discussants are members of different identifiable groups.
An important general conclusion is that polarization will likely occur
among heterogeneous as well as homogeneous groups, so long as there is a
determinate initial predisposition among members, taken as a whole. The
fact that some people oppose the dominant view will not prevent
polarization from occurring. On the other hand, larger shifts are naturally to
be expected within groups of like-minded people,"° and as noted,
depolarization is likely if the group is lacking a median predeliberation
view in one direction or another, or if it consists of equally opposed
subgroups whose members are willing to listen to one another.
A final question involves the effect of holding the median constant, but
varying the "width" of the distribution of view within the deliberating
group. In case A, for example, a group of six people, asked for their views
on nuclear power on a scale of -5 (" strongly opposed") to +5 (" strongly in
favor"), might have a predeliberation median of +2, with one at +1, one at
+3, and four at +2. Here the prediction is that the group would come out at
+3, and also that this would be the median of postdeliberation views,
anonymously expressed. But compare case B, with a group with a
predeliberation median also of +2 but with two at +4, two at +2, and two at
0. Because the median is the same, the predicted outcome is the same in
case B as case A; but is this likely? I am aware of only one study that tests
this question: the punitive damage study referred to above, which also
contains the largest data set on the choice shift phenomenon, involving
3000 people and 500 deliberating groups.'' In this study, the shift
100. This is an oversimplication. What really matters is the predeliberation mean; the more
extreme means will produce more extreme shifts, and a more extreme mean can exist within a
heterogeneous group (say, a mean of +3, on a scale of -5 to +5, with a range of views) than in a
group of like-minded people (say, a mean of +1, on the same scale, because every member is at
101. Schkade et al., supra note 8. There is also a question about the effects, in experiments or
in the real world over time, of small differences in initial views. Is it really the case, for example,
that a group with five people opposed to affirmative action, and six in favor, will end up in a very
different place from a group with six people opposed, and five in favor? Probably the best answer
is that because the initial median is so close in the two cases, significant shifts over time are
unlikely in experimental settings and probably in the real world.
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depended on the median predeliberation judgment, and was not affected by
wide or narrow spreads.'0 2
E. Actual Deliberation Within Identifiable Groups: Iterated
"Polarization Games"?
Studies of group polarization involve one-shot experiments. What are
the implications for people who meet with each other not once, but on a
regular basis? The basic answer is that if participants engage in repeated
discussions-if, for example, they meet each month, express views, and
take votes-there should be repeated shifts toward, and past, the defined
pole. If a group of citizens is thinking about genetic engineering of food, or
the minimum wage, or the World Trade Organization, the consequence of
their discussions, over time, should be to lead in quite extreme directions.
In these iterated "polarization games," deliberation over time should
produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than
those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began. In
fact, the idea of iterated polarization games seems far more realistic than
the processes studied in one-shot experiments.
There appears to be no study of such iterated polarization games. But
the hypothesized outcomes are less fanciful than they might seem. In the
jury study referred to above, deliberating groups frequently came up with
punishment ratings, and with dollar awards, as high as or even higher than
that of any individual, prior to deliberation.'0 3 And it is not difficult to think
of real-world groups in which deliberation, over time, appears to shift both
groups and individuals to positions that they could not possibly have
accepted early on." Iterated polarization games are an important real-world
phenomenon.
But this raises two questions: Why and when do groups stop
polarizing? Why and when do they terminate at a certain point, or even shift
in the opposite direction? Nothing in the literature on group polarization
adequately answers these questions. 15 But it is possible to speculate that
polarization often ends or reverses as a result of some external shock-as,
for example, when new members add new arguments, when the simple self-
102. Id. at 1156.
103. Id. at 1140.
104. For a relevant discussion of deliberating groups in the 1960s, see JAMES MILLER,
"DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS": FROM PORT HURON TO THE SIEGE OF CHICAGO (1994),
which traces increased radicalism and the spread of radical ideas; compare this with the discussion
of "ethnification" in Eastern Europe in Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation
Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 648-49 (1998). See infra notes 125-126
and accompanying text.
105. See TURNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 152 (suggesting that there is no clear answer to the
question, "For what range of situations is polarization predicted?").
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interest of political leaders produces a shift in direction,'06 or when new
changes in fact or value alter the perspectives and incentives of group
members. Social cascades often change direction as a result of such external
shocks, as through the release of new information;"°7 the same processes
seem to terminate or t6 reverse group polarization.
F. Rhetorical Asymmetry and the "Severity Shift": A Pervasive
Phenomenon?
The previously discussed study of punitive damages awards by juries
found a striking pattern for dollar awards.08 For any dollar award above
zero, the general effect of deliberation was to increase awards above those
of the median voter. This was a kind of "severity shift." Dollar awards did
not simply polarize; while higher awards increased dramatically, as
compared to the median of predeliberation votes, lower awards increased as
well. Both the original experiment and a follow-up experiment suggest that
the severity shift is a product of a rhetorical asymmetry that favors, other
things being equal, the person or persons urging higher awards."°9 The
reason appears to be that with respect to dollar awards involving a corporate
defendant, certain arguments-" we need to deter this kind of conduct,"
"we need to send a powerful signal," "we need to attract their attention" -
tend to have comparatively greater weight.1"°
Undoubtedly there are many other contexts that give rise to rhetorical
asymmetry, and undoubtedly the asymmetry can affect outcomes in
democratic institutions, as it did in the jury study. Legislative judgments
about criminal punishment may, for example, involve an asymmetry of
exactly this kind; those favoring greater punishment for drug-related
offenses appear to be at a systematic advantage over those favoring lesser
punishment. In certain settings, those favoring lower taxes, or more aid for
scholarship students, or greater funding for environmental protection, may
have a similar rhetorical advantage. For present purposes, the point is that
when there is an initial distribution of views in a certain direction, and when
existing norms give a rhetorical advantage to a more extreme movement in
that direction, quite extreme shifts can be expected."
106. See the discussion of legislators infra Subsection IV.E.4. Note, as inevitably noisy real-
world examples, the centrist shift of the Democratic Party from 1980 to 1992 and the apparent
centrist shift of the Republican Party from 1995 to 2000.
107. Hirschleifer, supra note 18, at 198-200 (discussing effects of public releases of
information).
108. Schkade et aL, supra note 8.
109. Id. at 1161-62.
110. Id.
111. Data from the study of punitive damages awards strongly support this speculation, with
many deliberating juries producing dollar awards higher-and sometimes significantly higher-
than the highest individual dollar award prior to deliberation. See id. at 1155-56. See also Cason &
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IV. POLARIZATION AND DEMOCRACY
In this Part, I discuss evidence of group polarization in legal and
political institutions, and I trace some implications of that evidence for
participants in a deliberative democracy. My principal aim is descriptive,
not normative. The relevant processes often create serious trouble for
deliberative bodies, a point taken up in more detail in Parts V and VI.
A. Polarizing Events and Polarization Entrepreneurs
Survey evidence shows that dramatic events, such as the assassination
of Martin Luther King and civil rights protests, tend to polarize attitudes,
with both positive and negative attitudes increasing within demographic
groups. Discussion often hardens attitudes toward outsiders and social
change; thus "[proposals for establishment of a halfway house or a
correctional facility have typically elicited private apprehensions which,
after discussion, become polarized into overt paranoia and hostility." 11 2 In
fact, it is possible to imagine "professional polarizers," or "polarization
entrepreneurs,"" 3 that is, political activists who have as one of their goals
the creation of spheres in which like-minded people can hear a particular
point of view from one or more articulate people, and also participate,
actually or vicariously, in a deliberative discussion in which that point of
view becomes entrenched and strengthened. Those seeking to promote
social reform might begin by promoting discussions among people who
tend to favor the relevant reform.
As an example, consider the success of Lois Marie Gibbs, a Love Canal
resident who became the principal force behind the national concern with
abandoned hazardous waste dumps."4 Gibbs self-consciously engaged in
efforts to mobilize citizens around that issue, partly by promoting
discussions by like-minded people, first in small groups, then in larger
Mui, supra note 8, at 1476-78, which finds that, regardless of the initial distribution of views,
groups systematically shift in the direction of greater willingness to sacrifice their material self-
interest for the sake of fairness. Cason and Mui study choice shifts in the distinctive setting of the
Dictator Game, in which a proposer is asked to divide a certain sum of money between herself and
another subject, who must accept any allocation that the proposer selects. They find that for
groups generally, the consequence of group discussion is to shift the proposed allocation in the
direction of equality.
112. David G. Myers, Polarizing Effects of Social Interaction, in GROUP DECISION MAKING,
supra note 87, at 125, 135.
113. Compare the discussion of availability entrepreneurs in Kuran & Sunstein, supra note
25, at 733, and of norm entrepreneurs in Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 909 (1996); these terms emphasize different kinds of signaling by
political leaders, whether self-interested or altruistic. The polarization entrepreneur, like the
availability entrepreneur, shows an awareness of certain aspects of human psychology that are
easily exploited to produce movement in preferred directions.
114. See LoIs MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL: THE STORY CONTINUES ... (1998).
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ones." 5 In fact, the environmental area is filled with leaders who took
advantage of cascade-like processes and group polarization." 6
Polarization is also likely to be produced by magazines with
identifiable political convictions, such as the American Prospect, the
Weekly Standard, the New Republic, and the National Review; by Pat
Robertson and his special television programs devoted to his preferred
causes; and by talk radio hosts with distinctive positions that are generally
shared by their audiences. Because the results of group polarization cannot
be evaluated in the abstract, nothing need be dishonorable in these efforts.
What can be said, in the abstract, is that attempts to ensure discussion
among people with similar predispositions may succeed in increasing the
confidence of individual participants and also in moving them toward more
extreme positions. Thus would-be social reformers do well to create
forums, whether in person, over the air, in cyberspace, or in print, in which
people with similar inclinations frequently speak with one another and can
develop a clear sense of shared identity.
B. Outgroups
Group polarization has particular implications for insulated
"outgroups" and, in the extreme case, for the treatment of conspiracies.
Recall that polarization increases when group members identify themselves
along some salient dimension and especially when the group is able to
define itself by contrast to another group."' Outgroups are, by definition, in
this position of self-contrast to others. Excluded by choice or coercion from
discussion with others, such groups may become polarized in quite extreme
directions, often in part because of group polarization. In the midst of
Communist rule, for example, the anticommunist underground was subject
to polarization,"5 sometimes undoubtedly for the better, but sometimes for
worse. Acts of extremism (including murders and suicides) by outgroups
are a possible result,"9 especially if we consider the fact that extreme
groups show comparatively greater polarization. 20 There is also likely to be
some rhetorical asymmetry within such groups, so that arguments in a
certain direction have the automatic upper hand.
The tendency toward polarization among outgroups helps explain
special concern about hate speech, by which group antagonisms can be
115. Id.at28-110.
116. See PENINA GLAZER & MYRON GLAZER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRUSADERS 6-15, 50-
57, 171-73 (1998).
117. TURNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 154.
118. I owe the example to Wiktor Osiatynski.
119. Cf. ARONSON, supra note 17, at 242-43 (discussing the mass suicide at Jonestown).
120. TURNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 158, 167-70.
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heightened, and it simultaneously raises some questions about the idea that
certain group discussions produce "consciousness raising." It is possible, at
least, that the consequence of discussion is not only or mostly to raise
consciousness (an ambiguous idea to be sure), but to produce group
polarization in one direction or another-and at the same time to increase
confidence in the position that has newly emerged.' This does not mean
that consciousness is never raised; undoubtedly group discussion can
identify and clarify problems that were previously repressed, or understood
as an individual rather than social product. But nothing of this sort is
established by the mere fact that views have changed and coalesced, and are
held, post-discussion, with a high degree of confidence. 
2
An understanding of group polarization also casts light on the
imposition of liability for criminal conspiracy, which can be added to the
penalty for the substantive offense in most jurisdictions. It is tempting to
think that this kind of "doubling up" is indefensible, a form of overkill. But
if the act of conspiring leads people moderately disposed toward criminal
behavior to be more than moderately disposed, precisely because they are
conspiring together, it makes sense, on grounds of deterrence, to impose
additional penalties. Some courts have come close to recognizing this point
in discussing the imposition of distinct sanctions on conspiracies.'23
C. Feuds, Ethnic and International Strife, and War
Group polarization is likely to be at work in feuds of all kinds. One of
the characteristic features of feuds is that members of feuding groups tend
to talk only to one another, fueling and amplifying their outrage, and
solidifying their impression of the relevant events. Informational and
reputational forces are very much at work here, producing cascade effects,
and group polarization can lead members to increasingly extreme positions.
These effects are present within ethnic groups and even nations,
notwithstanding the usually high degree of national heterogeneity. In
America, sharp divergences between whites and African Americans, on
particular salient events or more generally, can be explained by reference to
group polarization."
Timur Kuran has explored the broader international phenomenon of
"ethnification." Kuran's basic claim is that in many nations, including
121. Heath & Gonzalez, supra note 81, at 323-24.
122. Id. at 322.
123. E.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961) ("Concerted
action. .. decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of
criminality."). I am grateful to Dan Kahan for pressing this point. Recall that while actual burglars
show a cautious shift in general conversation, their practices show a shift toward greater risk-
taking (and correspondingly greater dangers for ordinary citizens). Cromwell et al., supra note 67.
124. See the treatment in JACOBS, supra note 14, at 140-51.
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Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, ethnic strife is not the product of a
reawakening of long-suppressed resentments, but instead of reputational
cascades. In this process, a failure to engage in ethnically identified activity
produces reputational sanctions, which grow in intensity over time as
increasing numbers of people join the cascade. Initially people may be
asked to dress in an ethnically identifiable way; later they may be asked to
engage in certain celebrations and to participate in meetings; still later they
may be asked to segregate themselves. Hence "the fears and antagonisms
that accompany high levels of ethnic activity may be a result of
ethnification rather than its root cause." Kuran does not refer to group
polarization. But an understanding of this phenomenon would much fortify
his analysis, by showing how within-group discussion (which is, under
conditions of ethnification, an increasingly large percentage of total
discussion) can ensure that ethnic groups, and individual members of ethnic
groups, end up with a far stronger ethnic identification than the median
member had before discussions began. In the extreme case, the result might
be war.'26 And when a war begins, group polarization, if it operates at the
national level, can help ensure continued hostility and antagonism.
D. The Internet, Communications Policy, and Mass Deliberation
Many people have expressed concern about processes of social
influence on the mass media and the Internet. 7 The general problem is said
to be one of fragmentation, with certain people hearing more and louder
versions of their own preexisting commitments, thus reducing the benefits
that come from exposure to competing views and unnoticed problems. 28
With greater specialization, people are increasingly able to avoid general
interest newspapers and magazines and to make choices that reflect their
own predispositions. The Internet makes it possible for people to design
their own highly individual communications packages, filtering out
troublesome issues and disfavored voices. Long before the Internet, it was
possible to discuss the "racial stratification of the public sphere" by
reference to divergences between white and African-American
newspapers.'29 New communications technologies may increase this
phenomenon. 30
125. Kuran, supra note 104, at 648.
126. See id. at 650-51.
127. E.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION 124-32 (1999).
128. Id. at 124-28.




Group polarization explains why a fragmented communications market
may create problems. 31 A "plausible hypothesis is that the Internet-like
setting is most likely to create a strong tendency toward group polarization
when the members of the group feel some sense of group identity." 132 If
certain people are deliberating with many like-minded others, views will
not be reinforced, but instead will be shifted to more extreme points. This
cannot be said to be bad by itself-perhaps the increased extremism is
good-but it is certainly troublesome if diverse social groups are led,
through predictable mechanisms, toward increasingly opposing and ever
more extreme views. Processes of this general sort have threatened both
peace and stability in some nations. 33 Both fragmentation and violence are
possible results. Group polarization can intensify if people are speaking
anonymously and if attention is drawn, through one or another means, to
group membership. Many Internet discussion groups have precisely this
feature. 13' The Internet may thus serve, for many, as a breeding ground for
extremism.
An understanding of group polarization raises more general issues
about communications policy. Under the "fairness doctrine," now largely
abandoned,'35 broadcasters were required to devote time to public issues
and to allow an opportunity for opposing views to speak. The second prong
of the doctrine was designed to ensure that listeners would not be exposed
to any single view. When the FCC abandoned the fairness doctrine, it did so
on the ground that this second prong often led broadcasters to avoid
controversial issues entirely, and to present views in a way that suggested a
bland uniformity.'36 Subsequent research has suggested that the elimination
of the fairness doctrine has indeed produced a flowering of controversial
substantive programming, frequently with an extreme view of one kind or
another; consider talk radio.33 Typically this is regarded as a story of
wonderfully successful deregulation. But from the standpoint of group
polarization, things are more complicated. The growth of issues-oriented
programming with a strong, often extreme view may create group
polarization, and all too many people might be exposed to louder echoes of
their own voices, resulting in social fragmentation, enmity, and
131. A detailed discussion can be found in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (draft of June
25, 2000) (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript on file with The Yale Law Journal).
132. WALLACE, supra note 3, at 78.
133. Kuran, supra note 104, at 635-51.
134. Compare the demonstration of serious errors within online working groups in Ross
Hightower & Luftus Sayeed, The Impact of Computer-Mediated Communication Systems on
Biased Group Discussion, 11 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 33 (1995).
135. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
136. Id. at 661.
137. Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a "Chilling Effect"?
Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1997) (offering an
affirmative answer to the question in the title).
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misunderstanding. Perhaps it is better for people to hear fewer controversial
views than for them to hear a single such view stated over and over again.
It is not clear what can be done about this situation. But it certainly
makes sense to consider communications initiatives that would ensure that
people are exposed to a range of reasonable views, not simply one. This
was the original inspiration for the fairness doctrine, and there is reason to
encourage media outlets to implement the same goal today. Thus
Habermas's suggestion:
The diffusion of information and points of view.., is not the only
thing that matters in public processes of communication, nor is it
the most important.... [T]he rules of a shared practice of
communication are of greater significance for structuring public
opinion. Agreement on issues and contributions develops only as
the result of more or less exhaustive controversy in which
proposals, information, and reasons can be more or less rationally
dealt with.13
Perhaps a code of fair programming could promote voluntary self-
regulation in this direction. 139 With respect to the Internet, Andrew Shapiro
has suggested public subsidy of a civic icon that would promote exposure to
substantive discussions from a variety of viewpoints. 4° An appreciation of
group polarization suggests the need for creative approaches designed to
ensure that people do not simply read their "Daily Me." 
141
E. Deliberation and Polarization in Public Institutions
I now turn to brief discussions of group polarization in government
institutions.
1. Juries
Group polarization on juries is well-documented; the jury, in fact, is the
only legal institution for which direct evidence of group polarization exists.
In experimental settings, polarization has been found in numerous instances
with respect to guilt and innocence, and indeed this appears to be an
uncontradicted finding.'42 Outside of the experimental setting, we know that
138. HABERMAS, supra note 5, at 362.
139. Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 549-57
(2000).
140. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 205-07; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 131 (manuscript at
102-14) (discussing Shapiro's proposal and other reforms designed to promote exposure to
diverse ideas).
141. The term comes from Nicholas Negroponte. See SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 45.
142. BROWN, supra note 8, at 227-29 (collecting studies).
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the median predeliberation verdict predicts the final outcome ninety percent
of the time in cases where juries do not hang; this provides "powerful
presumptive evidence that group polarization occurs in real juries." 143
2. Independent Regulatory Commissions
The twentieth century has seen the rise of a number of "independent"
regulatory commissions, including the Federal Communications
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the National Labor
Relations Board. A striking but generally overlooked provision of the
relevant statutes requires bipartisan membership: The independent
commissions cannot have more than a certain number of members from any
one political party.144 A simple and undoubtedly correct explanation of this
unusual requirement is that Congress wanted to ensure that no commission
would be dominated by any single party. But an understanding of group
polarization would strengthen any such concern on Congress's part. An
independent agency that is all Democratic, or all Republican, might polarize
toward an extreme position, likely more extreme than that of the median
Democrat or Republican, and possibly more extreme than that of any
member standing alone. A requirement of bipartisan membership can
operate as a check against movements of this kind.
3. Multimember Courts
Group polarization might also occur on multimember courts.
Notwithstanding platitudes about judicial neutrality, judges often have a
great deal of latitude, sometimes in the ultimate outcome, more often in
determining the reach of their decision. If a court consists of three or more
like-minded judges, it may well end up with a relatively extreme position,
more extreme in fact than the position it would occupy if it consisted of two
like-minded individuals and one of a different orientation.
There is little direct confirmation of this general proposition. But
considerable support comes from two studies of judicial behavior on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 4 The first
study finds a tendency toward more extreme results when a panel consists
of judges from a single political party; most notably, a panel of three
Republican judges is far more likely than a panel of two Republicans and
143. Id. at 229. See Schkade et al., supra note 8, for a treatment of choice shifts on juries
deliberating about punitive damages.
144. 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5) (1994) (FCC); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994) (FTC).
145. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Richard
L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717, 1755
(1997).
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one Democrat to reverse an environmental decision at the behest of industry
challengers." This is precisely what would be predicted by group
polarization: A homogeneous panel is far more likely to go in an extreme
direction than a mixed panel.
The second study is a bit more complex.147 Under Chevron v. NRDC,
14
1
courts are supposed to uphold agency interpretations of law so long as the
interpretations are "reasonable." The study found a dramatic difference in
the way politically divided panels (with judges appointed by presidents
from more than one party) and "unified" panels (with judges appointed by
presidents from only one party) on the D.C. Circuit interpreted this
stricture. On divided panels in which a majority of the panel might be
expected to be hostile to the agency on, broadly speaking, political grounds,
the court deferred to the agency 62% of the time.'49 But on unified panels,
in which the court might be expected to be hostile to the agency, the court
upheld the agency interpretation only 33% of the time. 50 Note that this was
the only asymmetry in the data; when courts were expected to uphold the
agency's decision on political controls, they did so over 70% of the time,
whether unified (71% of the time) or divided (84% of the time).15' There is
no smoking gun here, but it seems reasonable to speculate that the
seemingly bizarre result-a mere 33% validation rate in cases in which the
panel was unified-reflects a process of group polarization. A group of
like-minded judges may well take the relatively unusual step of rejecting an
agency interpretation, whereas a divided panel, with a check on any
tendency toward extreme outcomes, is more likely to take the conventional
route.
4. Legislatures
Legislators are likely to be susceptible to group polarization, partly
because of the effects of limited argument pools, and perhaps above all
because of social influence (including the importance of conveying a proper
signal to fellow legislators and constituents). Imagine, for example, that a
group of Republicans and a group of Democrats are thinking about how to
vote on a proposed law. If Republicans are speaking mostly with
Republicans, and if Democrats are speaking mostly with Democrats, one
should expect a hardening of views toward the more extreme points.
Undoubtedly this is part (certainly not all) of the explanation of party-line
146. Revesz, supra note 145, at 1755.
147. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 145.
148. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).





voting. Mechanisms of group polarization will sometimes be at work with
constituents as well. It is easy to imagine a society in which Republicans
speak mostly with each other; one can imagine a society in which
Democrats speak mostly with one another too. If this is the situation,
polarization should occur within political camps.
V. DELIBERATIVE TROUBLE?
This Part turns to normative issues involving the relationship among
group polarization, democratic theory, and legal institutions. I focus in
particular on the implications of group polarization for institutional design,
with special reference to the uses of heterogeneity and the complex issues
presented by deliberation inside particular "enclaves."
The central problem is that widespread error and social fragmentation
are likely to result when like-minded people, insulated from others, move in
extreme directions simply because of limited argument pools and parochial
influences. As an extreme example, consider a system of one-party
domination, which stifles dissent in part because it refuses to establish
space for the emergence of divergent positions; in this way, it intensifies
polarization within the party while also disabling external criticism.
In terms of institutional design, the most natural response is to ensure
that members of deliberating groups, whether small or large, will not isolate
themselves from competing views-a point with implications for
multimember courts, open primaries, freedom of association, and the
architecture of the Internet. Here, then, is a plea for ensuring that
deliberation occurs within a large and heterogeneous public sphere, and for
guarding against a situation in which like-minded people wall themselves
off from alternative perspectives.
But there is a difficulty with this response: A certain measure of
isolation will, in some cases, be crucial to the development of ideas and
approaches that would not otherwise emerge and that deserve a social
hearing.'52 Members of low-status groups are often quiet within
heterogeneous bodies, and deliberation in such bodies tends to be
dominated by high-status members. Any shift-in technology, norms, or
legal practice-that increases the number of deliberating enclaves will
likewise increase the diversity of society's aggregate "argument pool"
while also increasing the danger of extremism and instability, ultimately
even violence. Shifts toward a general "public sphere," without much in
the way of enclave deliberation, will decrease the likelihood of extremism
and instability, but at the same time produce what may be a stifling
152. See the empirical references in Christensen & Abbott, supra note 16, at 273-77.
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uniformity. "'53 And shifts toward more in the way of enclave deliberation
will increase society's aggregate "argument pool," and hence enrich the
marketplace of ideas,'54 while also increasing fragmentation, hostility, and
perhaps even violence.
No algorithm is available to solve the resulting conundrums. But some
general lessons do emerge. It is important to ensure social spaces for
deliberation by like-minded persons, but it is equally important to ensure
that members of the relevant groups are not isolated from conversation with
people having quite different views. The goal of that conversation is to
promote the interests of those inside and outside the relevant enclaves, by
subjecting group members to competing positions, by allowing them to
exchange views with others and to see things from their point of view, and
by ensuring that the wider society does not marginalize, and thus insulate
itself from, views that may turn out to be right or at least informative.
Ideas of this kind have a central place in the constitutional framework,
with the system of checks and balances, bicameralism, and the Framers'
explicit rejection of the "right to instruct" representatives.155 They also
have an important emerging place on the Internet, where there are many
current proposals to create a "public sphere" involving discussions among
diverse people who would otherwise be in contact largely with those who
are like-minded. 156 In these ways, an understanding of group polarization
helps provide a better sense of how institutions, both old and new, might be
restructured in the service of democratic ideals.
A. Doubts and Questions
1. Why Deliberate?
It should be clear that the phenomenon of group polarization, placed
alongside the phenomenon of social cascades, raises severe doubts about
the view that deliberation is a simple or unambiguous good. Of course
deliberation might be justified on many different grounds.'57 It may be that
on the question at issue, there is a truth of the matter-a correct answer-
and deliberation might be thought to be the best way of reaching it. Perhaps
group decisions, based on an exchange of reasons, are more likely to be
right than decisions made by individuals. Alternatively, society might favor
153. See the discussion of the shift, over time, from the "unthinkable" to the "unthought" in
KURAN, supra note 30, at 176-95.
154. See the discussion of African-American newspapers in JACOBS, supra note 14, at 31-53.
155. Infra text accompanying notes 163-172.
156. E.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 205-07; SUNSTEIN, supra note 131 (manuscript at
102-03, 111-14).
157. For various perspectives, see DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 5.
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deliberation on a quite different ground: Doubting whether there is a truth
of the matter, a society might seek a deliberative process on the theory that
this is the only reasonable and fair way to reach a decision that will be
imposed on the group.'58 Or deliberation might be seen as a way to reach
some sort of shared understanding or to ensure a form of mutual respect.
Group polarization does not create obvious difficulties for all of these
accounts. But it does raise real questions about the widespread idea that
deliberation is the best way of producing right answers.
If the effect of deliberation is to move people toward a more extreme
point in the direction of their original tendency, why is it anything to
celebrate? The underlying mechanisms do not provide much reason for
confidence. If people shift their position in order to maintain their
reputation and self-conception, is there any reason to think that deliberation
is making things better rather than worse? If shifts occur as a result of
partial and frequently skewed argument pools, the results of deliberative
judgments may be far worse than the results of simply taking the median of
predeliberation judgments.
To be sure, those who emphasize the ideals associated with deliberative
democracy tend to emphasize its preconditions, which include political
equality, an absence of strategic behavior, full information, and the goal of
"reaching understanding." '59 In real-world deliberations, behavior is often
strategic, and equality is often absent in one or another form. But group
polarization is likely to occur even in the face of equality and of entirely
conscientious efforts at reaching both truth and understanding. The
existence of a limited argument pool, strengthening the existing tendency
within the group, will operate in favor of group polarization even if no
individual behaves strategically. By itself, this will produce group
polarization, whether or not social influence is operating.
In any case, social influences need not be inconsistent with the effort to
produce truth and understanding. When people attempt to position
themselves in a way that fits with their best self-conception or their
preferred self-presentation, nothing has gone wrong, even from the
standpoint of deliberation's most enthusiastic defenders."6 Perhaps group
polarization could be reduced or even eliminated if we emphasized that full
158. See the discussion of imperfect procedural justice and pure procedural justice in RAWLS,
supra note 2, at 83-90.
159. E.g., I JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 99 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) (1981). Thus Habermas distinguishes between strategic and
communicative action and stresses "the cooperatively pursued goal of reaching understanding."
Id. Compare Habermas's view with the treatment in GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 5, at
52-94, referring to the idea of reciprocity, which emphasizes the desire to justify one's position by
reference to reasons.
160. See Robert E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE
THEORY 75, 77-90 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986) (discussing self-censorship as a
check on invidious views).
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information is a precondition for good deliberation. By hypothesis,
argument pools would not be limited if all information were available. But
that requirement is extremely stringent, and if there is already full
information, the role of deliberation is greatly reduced. 6' In any case, the
group polarization phenomenon suggests that, in real-world situations,
deliberation is hardly guaranteed to increase the likelihood of arriving at
truth.
2. Movements Right and Wrong
Polarization does not necessarily mean that there has been a movement
in the wrong direction. Perhaps the more extreme tendency is better. Recall
that group polarization is likely to have fueled the antislavery movement
and many other movements that deserve widespread approval. In the
context of punitive damages awards, perhaps a severity shift produces good
outcomes. Extremism need hardly be a word of opprobrium; everything
depends on what extremists are arguing for. But when group discussion
leads people to more strongly held versions of the same view with which
they began, and when social influences and limited argument pools are
responsible, there is little reason for great confidence in the effects of
deliberation.
If it is possible to identify a particular viewpoint as unreasonable, it is
also possible to worry about group discussion among people who share that
viewpoint. As noted, this is a basis for justifying the decision to make
criminal conspiracy an independent crime; the act of conspiring itself raises
the stakes, and by hypothesis the actions ultimately at issue are unlawful
and beyond the pale.'62 An analogy can be found in discussions within hate
groups, on the Internet and elsewhere. If the underlying views are
unreasonable, it makes sense to fear that these discussions may fuel
increasing hatred. This does not mean that the discussions can or should be
regulated in a system dedicated to freedom of speech. But it does raise
questions about the idea that "more speech" is necessarily an adequate
remedy.
B. The Virtues of Heterogeneity
The simplest lesson here involves both individual susceptibility and
institutional design. For many people, mere awareness of the role of limited
argument pools and social influences might provide some inoculation
161. The role of deliberation is not eliminated. There remains the question of what to do,
given a certain understanding of the facts.
162. Supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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against inadequately justified movements of opinion within groups. More
importantly, institutions should be designed to ensure that when shifts are
occurring, it is not because of arbitrary or illegitimate constraints on the
available range of arguments. This is a central task of constitutional design.
In this light, a system of checks and balances might be explained, not as an
undemocratic check on the will of the people, but as an effort to protect
against potentially harmful consequences of group discussion.1
63
We have seen that the system of bicameralism, often challenged on
populist grounds,"6 might be defended by reference to the risk of group
polarization. Indeed, James Wilson's great lectures on law spoke of
bicameralism in these terms, referring to "instances, in which the people
have become the miserable victims of passions, operating on their
government without restraint," and seeing a "single legislature" as prone to
"sudden and violent fits of despotism, injustice, and cruelty."165 Efforts to
assure a plurality of views on regulatory commissions and courts can be
defended on similar grounds. As supporting evidence, consider the findings
that cohesive groups of like-minded people whose members are connected
by close social ties often suppress dissent and reach inferior decisions,
whereas heterogeneous groups, building identification through focus on a
common task rather than through other social ties, tend to produce the best
outcomes. 66
C. A Thought Experiment: Vindicating Hamilton
To explore some of the advantages of heterogeneity, imagine a
deliberating body consisting of all citizens in the relevant group; this may
mean all citizens in a community, a state, a nation, or the world. By
hypothesis, the argument pool would be very large. It would be limited only
to the extent that the set of citizen views was similarly limited. Social
influences would undoubtedly remain. Hence people might shift because
they want to maintain their reputation and self-conception, and to do this
they must stand in a certain relation to the rest of the group. But to the
extent that deliberation revealed to people that their private position was
different from what they thought it was in relation to the group, any shift
would be in response to an accurate understanding of all relevant citizens,
and not a product of a skewed group sample.
163. Federalist No. 51 can well be read in this light. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James
Madison).
164. See the recent proposals in Minnesota, outlined and discussed in George Will, Editorial,
One-House Town, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1999, at A35, 1999 WL 23312778.
165. JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 291 (Robert
Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
166. Harrington, supra note 83, at 25-26.
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This thought experiment does not suggest that the hypothesized
deliberating body would be ideal. Perhaps all citizens, presenting all
individual views, would offer a skewed picture from the normative point of
view; in a pervasively unjust society, a deliberating body consisting of
everyone may produce nothing to celebrate. Perhaps weak arguments would
be made and repeated and repeated again, while good arguments would be
offered infrequently. As I suggest below,'67 it is often important to ensure
that there are enclaves in which polarization will take place, precisely in
order to ensure the emergence of views that are suppressed, by social
influences or otherwise, but are reasonable or even right. But at least a
deliberating body of all citizens would remove some of the distortions in
the group polarization experiments, where generally like-minded people,
not exposed to others, shift in large part because of that limited exposure.'68
Many studies show that organizational performance is impaired by people's
failure to voice diverse views,'69 and this is a tendency against which
heterogeneity might guard.
Here, in fact, is a way of vindicating the passages from Hamilton and
Rawls with which I began. On this view, Hamilton and Rawls are not naive
enthusiasts for deliberation, oblivious to empirical realities, but are insisting
on the advantages of heterogeneity and of a wide argument pool being
placed before the deliberators. Indeed, this was Hamilton's claim with
respect to the "jarring of parties" within a bicameral legislature, a process
that, Hamilton contended, would "check the excesses of the majority"-
excesses that can be reinterpreted in terms of the phenomena I have been
describing. The Framers of the Bill of Rights originally rejected a "right to
instruct," by which constituents could tell their representatives how to vote;
the rejection was based on the idea that one job of the representative was to
"consult" with people from different states of the Union, and to make
decisions only after that consultation. 7 The rejection of the right to
instruct, on the theory that deliberators should be talking to people with
different experiences and viewpoints, seems to show an appreciation of the
risks of group polarization.
As I have suggested, central features of the constitutional design,
including the system of checks and balances, can be understood in similar
terms. Indeed, Madison defended his preference for large election districts
and long terms of service as a way of counteracting polarization-type forces
167. Infra text accompanying notes 173-177.
168. See Harrington, supra note 83, for supporting evidence in the context of concrete group
tasks (involving investment clubs).
169. Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, Differential Contributions of Majority and Minority Influence,
93 PSYCHOL. REv. 23 (1986); Harrington, supra note 83.
170. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 22.
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within particular constituencies. 7 ' Rawls's reference to the need to
"combin[e] information and enlarg[e] the range of arguments" through
discussion with a range of people strikes precisely the same note.'72
VI. ENCLAVE DELIBERATION AND SUPPRESSED VOICES
There are also potential vices in heterogeneity and potentially desirable
effects from deliberating "enclaves," consisting of groups of like-minded
individuals. It seems obvious that such groups can be extremely important
in a heterogeneous society, not least because members of some
demographic groups tend to be especially quiet when participating in
broader deliberative bodies. A special advantage of "enclave deliberation"
is that it promotes the development of positions that would otherwise be
invisible, silenced, or squelched in general debate.73 In numerous contexts,
this is a great advantage; many social movements have been made possible
through this route (as possible examples, consider feminism, 174 the civil
rights movement, religious conservatism, environmentalism, and the
movement for gay and lesbian rights).
The efforts of marginalized groups to exclude outsiders, and even of
political parties to limit their primaries to party members, can be justified in
similar terms. Even if group polarization is at work-perhaps because
group polarization is at work--enclaves can provide a wide range of social
benefits, not least because they greatly enrich the social argument pool. In
fact, the First Amendment right of expressive association should be
understood in precisely these terms. According protection to collective
effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from
suppression by the majority.
A. Low Status and High Status
In deliberating bodies, high-status members tend to initiate
communication more than others, and their ideas are more influential, partly
171. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 41-42
(1985).
172. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 359.
173. See, for example, the discussion of consciousness raising in CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OFTHE STATE 83-105 (1989).
174. A controversial and highly publicized case in point is the effort by the theologian Mary
Daly to exclude men from her class at Boston University. See Carey Goldberg, Facing Forced
Retirement, Iconoclastic Professor Keeps On Fighting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1999, at A13, 1999
WL 30476861; see also Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (upholding the
associational interest and right of exclusion of Boy Scouts); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 622 (1984) (rejecting the right of exclusion of the Jaycees).
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because low-status members lack confidence in their own abilities, partly
because they fear retribution. 17 For example, women's ideas are often less
influential and sometimes are "suppressed altogether in mixed-gender
groups," 176 and in ordinary circumstances, cultural minorities have
disproportionately little influence on decisions by culturally mixed
groups.177 It makes sense to promote deliberating enclaves in which
members of multiple groups may speak with one another and develop their
views.
But there is a serious danger in such enclaves. The danger is that
through the mechanisms discussed here, members will move to positions
that lack merit but are predictable consequences of the particular
circumstances of enclave deliberation. In the extreme case, enclave
deliberation may even put social stability at risk (for better or for worse).
And it is impossible to say, in the abstract, that those who sort themselves
into enclaves will generally move in a direction that is desirable for society
at large or even for its own members. It is easy to think of examples to the
contrary, such as the rise of Nazism, hate groups, and numerous "cults" of
various sorts; 7 ' readers can think of their own preferred illustrations.
There is no simple solution to the dangers of enclave deliberation.
Sometimes the threat to social stability is desirable. As Jefferson wrote,
turbulence can be "productive of good. It prevents the degeneracy of
government, and nourishes a general attention to... public affairs. I
hold... that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing . '. .." "' Any
judgments about enclave deliberation are hard to make without a sense of
the underlying substance-of what it is that divides the enclave from the
rest of society. From the standpoint of institutional design, the problem is
that any effort to promote enclave deliberation will ensure group
polarization within a wide range of groups, some necessary to the pursuit of
justice, others likely to promote injustice, and some potentially quite
dangerous. This makes clearer the sense in which Edmund Burke's
conception of representation-rejecting "local purposes" and "local
175. See Christensen & Abbott, supra note 16, at 273.
176. Id. at 274.
177. Catherine Kirchmeyer & Aaron Cohen, Multicultural Groups: Their Performance and
Reactions with Constructive Conflict, 17 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 153, 166 (1992). Interestingly,
there is evidence that with changes in gender norms, some tasks show no gender differences in
influence on groups. See Katherine W. Hawkins, Effects of Gender and Communication Content
on Leadership Emergence in Small Task-Oriented Groups, 26 SMALL GROUP RES. 234, 243-44
(1995).
178. See, e.g., ARONSON, supra note 17, at 242-43 (discussing the role of cult leaders); LEON
FESTINGER ET AL., WHEN PROPHECY FAILS 3-30 (1956) (discussing conditions for continued
commitment to implausible beliefs, including the need for social support).
179. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30, 1787), in THE PORTABLE
THOMAS JEFFERSON 416-17 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
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prejudices" in favor of "the general reason of the whole" 8 -- is not
contingently but instead essentially conservative (speaking purely
descriptively, as a safeguard of existing practices). The reason is that the
submersion of "local purposes" and "local prejudices" into a
heterogeneous "deliberative assembly" 181 will inevitably tend to weaken
the resolve of groups-and particularly low-status or marginalized
groups-whose purely internal deliberations would produce a high degree
of polarization.
Hence James Madison-with his fear of popular passions producing "a
rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of
property, or for any other improper or wicked project" '82-would naturally
be drawn to a Burkean conception of representation, favoring large election
districts and long length of service'83 to counteract the forces of
polarization. By contrast, those who believe that "destabilization" is an
intrinsic good,1"' or that the status quo contains sufficient injustice that it is
worthwhile to incur the risks of encouraging polarization on the part of
diverse groups, will, or should, be drawn to a system that enthusiastically
promotes insular deliberation within enclaves.
In a nation in which most people are confused or evil, enclave
deliberation may be the only way to develop a sense of clarity or justice, at
least for some. But even in such a nation, enclave deliberation is unlikely to
produce change unless the members of different enclaves are eventually
brought into contact with others. In democratic societies, the best response
is to ensure that any such enclaves are not walled off from competing
views, and that at certain points, there is an exchange of views between
enclave members and those who disagree with them. It is total or near-total
self-insulation, rather than group deliberation as such, that carries with it
the most serious dangers, often in the highly unfortunate (and sometimes
deadly) combination of extremism with marginality.
B. The Public Sphere and Appropriate Heterogeneity
1. The Public Sphere
For a designer or leader of any institution, it makes sense to promote
ample social space both for enclave deliberation and for discussions
180. Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors (Nov. 3, 1774), in BURKE's POLITICS: SELECTED
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE ON REFORM, REVOLUTION, AND WAR 116 (Ross
J.S. Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1949).
181. Id.
182. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
183. See Sunstein, supra note 171, at4l-42.
184. This is a possible reading of ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES MOVEMENT 39, 43, 53-57 (1986), which asserts the need for destabilization rights.
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involving a broad array of views, including views of those who have been
within diverse enclaves.'85 The idea of a "public sphere," developed most
prominently by Jurgen Habermas, can be understood as an effort to ensure a
domain in which multiple views can be heard by people with multiple
perspectives. 8 ' This understanding strongly supports current initiatives
designed to ensure deliberation among dissimilar people on the Internet. 87
The fact of group polarization suggests that it could be desirable to take
steps to reduce the likelihood that panels on federal courts of appeals
consist solely of appointees of presidents of any single political party.
88
Of course, any argument pool will be limited. No one has time to listen
to every point of view. But an understanding of group polarization helps
show that heterogeneous groups are often a far better source of good
judgments, simply because more arguments will be made available.
2. A New Look at Group Representation
An understanding of group polarization is also relevant to the
continuing debate over group representation. 89 The central issue here is
whether identifiable groups should be represented as such in political
institutions. Perhaps political groups should be allowed to have
representation to the extent that they are able to get more than a minimal
share of the vote. Perhaps steps should be taken to increase the likelihood
that members of disadvantaged or marginal groups have their own
representatives in the deliberating body. An understanding of group
polarization is hardly sufficient to reach a definitive conclusion about these
issues. But at least it can be said that group representation should help
counteract the risks of polarization, and susceptibility to cascade effects,
that come from deliberation among like-minded people. At the same time,
group representation should help reduce the dangers that come from
insulation of those in the smaller enclave, by subjecting enclave
representatives to a broader debate.
Seen in this light, the point of group representation is to promote a
process in which those in the enclave hear what others have to say, and in
which those in other enclaves, or in no enclaves at all, are able to listen to
185. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIASCOS 267-71 (2d ed. 1982).
186. See HABERMAS, supra note 9, at 231-50.
187. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 131 (manuscript at 102-03, 111-14).
188. See supra Subsection IV.E.3.
189. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 183-91
(1990) (urging group representation as a means of ensuring expression of plural perspectives);
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1585-89 (1988) (urging
group representation as a means of ensuring good deliberation about the public good). For an
overview of the debate, see also the essays in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND
ALTERNATIVES (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984).
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people with very different points of view. When groups are represented as
such in private and public institutions, it is to promote the airing of points
of view that otherwise go unheard. And there is a further benefit to group
representation: It works to prevent self-insulation on the part of group
members by ensuring that they hear what others have to say as well. Here
the benefits of group representation extend to both members and
nonmembers of the relevant groups.
3. Appropriate Heterogeneity
For a deliberative democracy, a central question is how to ensure
appropriate heterogeneity. For example, it would not make sense to say
that in a deliberating group attempting to think through issues of affirmative
action, it is important to allow exposure to people who think that slavery
was good and should be restored. The constraints of time and attention call
for limits to heterogeneity; and-a separate point-for good deliberation to
take place, some views are properly placed off the table, simply because
time is limited and they are so invidious, or implausible, or both. This point
might seem to create a final conundrum: To know what points of view
should be represented in any group deliberation, it is important to have a
good sense of the substantive issues involved, indeed a sense sufficient to
generate judgments about what points of view must be included and
excluded. But if we already know that, does deliberation have any point at
all?
The answer is that we often do know enough to see which views count
as reasonable, without knowing which view counts as right, and this point is
sufficient to allow people to construct deliberative processes that should
correct for the most serious problems potentially created by group
polarization. What is necessary is not to allow every view to be heard, but
to ensure that no single view is so widely heard, and reinforced, that people
are unable to engage in critical evaluation of the reasonable competitors.
Of course, the provision of diverse views does not guarantee good
deliberation. Among other things, most people are subject to "confirmation
bias," in accordance with which exposure to a competing position will not
dislodge and may even strengthen the antecedently held position."9 On
questions of morality and fairness, and undoubtedly other questions as well,
those who listen to diverse opinions may well emerge from the experience
with an enhanced belief in the soundness of their original commitment. 9 '
But this is not a universal phenomenon, and at least an understanding of
190. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
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competing views is likely to weaken the forms of fragmentation and
misunderstanding that come from deliberation among the like-minded.
92
C. The Deliberative Opinion Poll: A Contrast
James Fishkin has pioneered the idea of "deliberative polling," in
which small groups consisting of highly diverse individuals are asked to
come together and to deliberate about various issues.'93 Deliberative
opinion polls have now been conducted in several nations, including the
United States, England, and Australia. Fishkin finds some noteworthy shifts
in individual views, but he does not find a systematic tendency toward
polarization. In his studies, individuals shift both toward and away from the
median of predeliberation views. For present purposes, what is noteworthy
about Fishkin's experiments is that they do not involve isolated enclaves;
this is part of the reason for the absence of polarization effects.
In England, for example, deliberation led to reduced interest in using
imprisonment as a tool for combating crime."9 The percentage believing
that "sending more offenders to prison" is an effective way to prevent
crime went down from 57% to 38%; the percentage believing that fewer
people should be sent to prison increased from 29% to 44%; belief in the
effectiveness of "stiffer sentences" was reduced from 78% to 65%.
Similar shifts were shown in the direction of greater enthusiasm for
procedural rights of defendants and increased willingness to explore
alternatives to prison."' In other experiments with the deliberative opinion
poll, shifts included a mixture of findings, with larger percentages of
individuals concluding that legal pressures should be increased on fathers
for child support (from 70% to 85%) and that welfare and health care
should be turned over to the states (from 56% to 66%).97 On many issues,
deliberation increased the intensity with which people held their preexisting
convictions.19 These findings are consistent with the prediction of group
polarization. But this was hardly a uniform pattern, and on some questions,
deliberation increased the percentage of people holding a minority position
192. See Brian Mullen et a]., Group Cohesiveness and Quality of Decision Making,
25 SMALL GROUP RES. 189, 199-202 (1994); Brian Mullen & Carolyn Copper, The Relation
Between Group Cohesiveness and Performance: An Integration, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 210, 225
(1994). For evidence to this effect, see Harrngton, supra note 35, at 30-34.
193. JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE 43, 161-81 (1997).
194. Id. at 206-07.
195. Id.
196. d. at 207.
197. Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 6, at 23.
198. See id. at 22-23 (showing a jump, on a scale of 1 to 4, from 3.51 to 3.58 in intensity of
commitment to reducing the deficit; showing a jump, on a scale of 1 to 3, from 2.71 to 2.85 in
intensity of support for greater spending on education; and showing a jump, on a scale of 1 to 3,
from 1.95 to 2.16, in commitment to aiding American business interests abroad).
[Vol. 110: 71
Deliberative Trouble?
(with, for example, a jump from 36% to 57% of people favoring policies
making divorce "harder to get" )199 These are not the changes that would be
predicted by group polarization.
Several factors distinguish the deliberative opinion poll from
experiments on group polarization. First, Fishkin's deliberators did not vote
as a group, and while group polarization is observed when no group
decision is expected,2"o the extent of polarization may well decrease simply
because members have not been asked to sign onto a group decision as
such. Second, Fishkin's groups were overseen by a moderator; this attempt
to ensure a level of openness is likely to have altered some of the dynamics
discussed here. Third, Fishkin's groups were highly diverse and enclave
deliberation was impossible. Fourth, Fishkin's studies presented
participants with a set of written materials that attempted to be balanced and
that contained detailed arguments for both sides. The likely consequence
would be to move people in different directions from those that would be
expected by simple group discussion, unaffected by authoritative external
materials. Indeed, the very effort to produce balance should be expected to
shift large majorities into small ones, pressing both sides closer to 50%
representation; and this is in fact what was observed in many of the
outcomes in deliberative opinion polls.20'
In short, external materials shift the argument pool available to the
deliberators and are also likely to have effects on social influence. Once
certain arguments are on the table, it is harder to say how one or another
position will affect a group member's reputation. The most sensible
conclusion is that externally provided information, the existence of
monitors, an absence of a group decision, and the great heterogeneity of the
people involved in Fishkin's studies2 2 make the deliberative opinion poll
quite different from the group polarization studies.
Fishkin's experiments suggest that group polarization can be
heightened, diminished, or possibly even eliminated by seemingly small
alterations in institutional arrangements. To the extent that limited argument
pools and social influences are likely to have unfortunate effects,
correctives can be introduced, perhaps above all by exposing group
members, at one point or another, to arguments to which they are not
antecedently inclined. Current proposals would do well to incorporate an
199. Id. at 23; see also id. at 22 (showing an increase, on a scale of I to 3, from 1.40 to 1.59
in commitment to spending on foreign aid; also showing a decrease, on a scale of I to 3, from
2.38 to 2.27 in commitment to spending on Social Security).
200. See Teger & Pruitt, supra note 76, at 201-02 (finding group polarization on mere
exposure to the views of others).
201. Id. at 196-201.
202. Note, however, that choice shifts were produced in the context of jury deliberations, also
involving heterogeneous groups. Schkade et al., supra note 8, at 1154-56.
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understanding of these sometimes neglected facts.20 3 But the most important
lesson is the most general: It is desirable to create spaces for enclave
deliberation without insulating enclave members from those with opposing
views, and without insulating those outside of the enclave from the views of
those within it.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have discussed the phenomenon of group polarization
and explored some of its implications for deliberation generally and
deliberative democracy in particular. The central empirical finding is that
group discussion is likely to shift judgments toward a more extreme point in
the direction indicated by the median of predeliberation judgments. This is
true if a group decision is required; if individuals are polled anonymously
afterwards, they are likely to shift in precisely the same way.
The underlying mechanisms are twofold. The first involves people's
desire to stand in a particular relation to the group, perhaps for reputational
reasons, perhaps to maintain their self-conception. Shifts occur as people
find that it is necessary to alter their positions in order to maintain their self-
conception or their desired relation to the group. The second mechanism
involves limited "argument pools," as members of groups with a certain
initial tendency typically hear a large number of arguments in support of
that tendency, and few arguments in the other direction. When arguments
are skewed toward a particular point of view, group members will move in
the direction of that point of view. In a finding of special importance to
democratic theory, group polarization is heightened if members have a
sense of shared identity. And in an equally important finding, group
polarization is diminished, and depolarization may result, if members have
a degree of flexibility in their views and groups consist of an equal number
of people with opposing views.
In the abstract, and without knowing anything about the underlying
substance, it is impossible to say whether group polarization is good or bad.
But the mechanisms that underlie group polarization raise serious questions
about the view that deliberation is likely to yield correct answers to social
questions. Like-minded people engaged in discussion with one another may
lead each other in the direction of error and falsehood, simply because of
the limited argument pool and the operation of social influences. This point
very much bears on deliberation within insulated groups and hence on
203. Hence there is reason for caution about the proposal for "deliberation day" offered by
Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin. BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES FiSHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY
(forthcoming). The problem lies in the highly territorial nature of the proposal, in which people




emerging communications technologies, which allow a high degree of
individual filtering; 204 insulation and filtering can compound error. The
point also bears on the design of deliberating courts, legislatures, and
regulatory agencies. Above all, an understanding of group polarization
helps explain why like-minded people, engaged in deliberation with one
another, sometimes go to astonishing extremes and commit criminal or
even violent acts.0 s
This is the dark side of "enclave deliberation." But I have also
emphasized that deliberation within protected enclaves can be highly
desirable. Partly as a result of group polarization, enclave deliberation can
produce positions that would otherwise fail to emerge and that emphatically
deserve a public hearing. The case for enclave deliberation is strengthened
by evidence that members of low-status groups are likely to be silent in, or
silenced by, broader deliberating bodies. Group polarization within
enclaves might even operate as a counterweight to this problem.
In the abstract, it is not possible to specify the appropriate mix of
enclave deliberation and deliberation within larger publics. But an
appreciation of group polarization helps show why a free society takes steps
to protect deliberation within enclaves, to ensure that those inside enclaves
hear alternative views, and to ensure as well that those outside of particular
enclaves are exposed to what enclave members have to say. Above all, it is
important to avoid a situation in which people are exposed to softer and
louder echoes of their own voices.
In a heterogeneous society, this form of self-insulation can create
serious deliberative trouble, in the form of mutual incomprehension or
much worse. Legal arrangements will increase or reduce that trouble. I have
outlined some approaches that might ensure that heterogeneity, far from
being a source of social fragmentation, will operate as a creative force,
helping to identify problems and even solutions that might otherwise escape
notice.
204. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 186 (2000);
SHAPIRO, supra note 127. at 105-23.
205. The case of like-minded deliberators is the simplest one, but note that as long as there is
a defined median, group polarization can occur in heterogeneous groups as well.
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